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BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN 
LAW. By Daniel A. Farbert and Suzanna Sherry.* Oxford University 
Press, 1997. 195 pages. $25.0Q.tt 
Reviewed by Cynthia V. Ward* and Peter A. Alces** 
In the view of many radical legal scholars, liberal legal institutions can 
never produce social justice because they necessarily rely on a false and 
corrupt understanding of human beings. Against the standard liberal 
celebration of human autonomy and its importation into law via individual 
rights, radical critics urge the irreducibility of difference, the oppression 
inherent in the act of universalizing the rights-bearing autonomous 
individual, and, ultimately, the danger of grounding law in any definite 
concept of what "we" value most about human beings. 
But this critique reveals a fundamental tension between radical theory 
and practice. If, as many radical theorists maintain, it is either useless or 
necessarily oppressive to ground one's concept of law on a belief in certain 
foundational "samenesses"-such as autonomy and rationality-that are 
shared by all humans, then it is difficult to envision any kind of cordial 
relationship between justice and law, for the law necessarily enforces 
general understandings on particular persons and, to the extent that persons 
are irreducibly different, becomes an arbitrary, and therefore unjust, 
exercise of power over those whose views of the world are in conflict with 
legal rules and edicts. Yet radical legal scholars do, in fact, espouse a 
specific vision of law, especially of how law relates to issues of racial and 
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gender justice. 1 On what can this vision rest, given the prior conceptual 
premise of radical theory that the law must acknowledge difference and 
reject sameness? 
In Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law, 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry examine the radical vision of justice and 
its relationship to law. More specifically, Farber and Sherry target four 
core arguments of a group of scholars they call "radical 
multiculturalists. "2 These scholars share the foundational belief that 
"western ideas and institutions are socially constructed to serve the interests 
of the powerful, especially straight, white men. "3 They believe the 
concept of "merit" that allocates societal benefits, such as admission to 
jobs and schools of higher education, is a mask that allows liberal legalism 
to hide its perpetuation of racial- and gender-based domination behind a 
false claim to fairness and equal opportunity. 4 They argue that the liberals' 
celebration of reason oppresses groups such as women and minorities, who 
possess other, equally valuable "ways of knowing. "5 Finally, the radical 
multiculturalists view the liberal commitment to certain universal, objec-
tively "true" values-such as the virtue of individual liberty, of rational 
argument, and of freedom of speech-as a sham. For a radical 
multiculturhlist, all knowledge is a matter of perspective and the claim to 
universal knowledge is therefore an exercise of power imposed by the 
privileged on the disadvantaged. 6 
As Farber and Sherry point out, these radical beliefs conflict directly 
and fundamentally with the values that ground liberal law: 
Objectivity, reason, and universality are, of course, the crown 
jewels of our [liberal] Enlightenment heritage. At least some 
radicals, following Foucault, directly condemn the Enlightenment 
itself, as well as its progeny: liberalism and democracy. [Richard] 
Delgado suggests that "enlightenment-style Western democracy is 
I. See infra text accompanying notes 12-15. 
2. P. 5. 
3. P. 5. 
4. Seep. 31 (describing the radical multiculturalist belief that "conceptions of merit are invented 
by the powerful to reinforce their dominant position. What purport to be neutral standards of merit 
are simply tools of social subordination: 'merit is not merely contingent, it is racially biased.'" (quoting 
Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, 1he Tales of White Folic Doctrine, Narrative, and the 
Reconstruction of Racial Reality, 84 CAL. L. REv. 377, 403 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD DELGADO, 
THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995)))); p. 32 (stating that 
radical multiculturalists believe "[a]ll standards, everywhere in society, are merely social constructs"). 
5. See p. 25 (quoting Stanley Fish for the proposition that "like 'fairness,' 'merit,' and 'free 
speech,' Reason is a political entity," an "ideologically charged" product of a "decidedly political 
agenda"). 
6. See p. 30 ("The radicals, in keeping with their view that objectivity is impossible and claims 
to objectivity are merely power plays in disguise, argue that knowledge itself depends on the race or 
gender of the knower."). 
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... the source of black people's subordination" and "racism and 
enlightenment are the same thing." "Enlightenment is to racism," 
he continues, "as sexuality is to women's oppression-the very 
means by which we are kept down." He thus recommends that "if 
you are black or Mexican, you should flee Enlightenment-based 
democracies like mad, assuming you have any choice. "7 
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The authors' project in Beyond All Reason is to investigate radical 
multiculturalist beliefs in light of the legal and societal causes that radical 
scholars simultaneously espouse. 8 Farber and Sherry ask whether the radi-
cal rejection of truth, merit, and objectivity is compatible with the radicals' 
own vision of political and legal justice. 9 
Answering this question in the negative, Farber and Sherry expose a 
fundamental disconnect between the philosophical and the political commit-
ments of radical multiculturalism. 10 To the extent the former are accepted, 
the latter become impossible to achieve; conversely, in order to maintain 
coherently their political commitments to justice and equality, the radicals 
must abandon their attacks on truth, merit, and objectivity. 
We approach this review of Beyond All Reason from different 
perspectives. Part I offers an exposition of the Farber and Sherry approach 
to radical multiculturalism. In Part II, Professor Alces mines Farber and 
Sherry for insights into the question of whether, and to what extent, radical 
legal theory "matters" to the operational structure of the law. Should 
scholars whose writing examines legal questions within specific, a priori 
doctrinal boundaries care about radical multiculturalist theory? What, if 
anything, can such theory offer in the way of answers to the myriad ques-
tions and conflicts that arise out of actual court decisions and thus 
constitute the law at work in the lives of actual litigants and their attorneys? 
In the final analysis, can radical multiculturalism claim to have "advanced 
the ball" of legal scholarship in any material way? Alces charges that, 
from a perspective that seeks to integrate theory with doctrine, the authors 
of Beyond All Reason have failed to make a strong case against radical 
multiculturalism. Professor Alces concludes that Farber and Sherry missed 
an opportunity to reveal the fundamental and intractable problems with 
radical multiculturalist theory-problems that thoroughly justify scholarly 
skepticism-and instead make relatively peripheral criticisms. 
7. Pp. 28-29. 
8. P. 7. 
9. See, e.g., p. 9 (describing the authors' "normative critique" of radical multiculturalism in the 
context of their attempt to "show that the ideology doesn't work: [i]t fails to keep its [own political] 
promises"). 
10. P. 9. Because of the nature of the radical criticism of traditional legal scholarship, this possi-
bility must be of particular concern to anyone attempting to construct an internal critique of radical 
multiculturalism. 
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In Part ill, Professor Ward responds by defending Beyond All Reason 
against Professor Alces's attacks. She argues that Farber and Sherry's 
basic critique of radical multiculturalist theory is sound, but that their 
critique has already been transcended within radical theory by a renewed 
respect for its supposed enemy-liberal legalism. In Professor Ward's 
view, Farber and Sherry are quite right that radical legal theory cannot 
coherently generate a progressive law and politics. But radical feminists 
and critical race scholars are bridging the gap between theory and practice 
by reintroducing, as a socially progressive force, the possibilities of 
individual agency and the capacity for self-direction. Professor Ward 
concludes that this development suggests that individual rights, long the 
arch rival of radical feminists and scholars of race, should be recognized 
anew as the primary legal tool of social justice. 
I. Deconstructing Radical Multiculturalism 
Summarizing the principal tenets of the radical multiculturalist 
critique, Farber and Sherry make clear the political consequences of aban-
doning the quest for merit, objectivity, and truth: 
If the modern era begins with the European Enlightenment, the 
postmodern era that captivates the radical multiculturalists begins 
with its rejection. According to the new radicals, the Enlightenment-
inspired ideas that have previously structured our world, especially 
the legal and academic parts of it, are a fraud perpetrated and 
perpetuated by white males to consolidate their own power. Those 
who disagree are not only blind but bigoted. The Enlightenment's 
goal of an objective and reasoned basis for knowledge, merit, truth, 
justice, and the like is an impossibility: "objectivity," in the sense of 
standards of judgment that transcend individual perspectives, does not 
exist. Reason is just another code word for the views of the 
privileged. The Enlightenment itself merely replaced one socially 
constructed view of reality with another, mistaking power for 
knowledge. There is naught but power. 11 
Politics, in short, is simply another way of describing the struggle for 
power, while law is used to impose the perspective of the powerful on the 
rest of us. On this view, the key to effecting political and legal reform is 
not to rely on persuading others of the objective justice of one's claim 
(although this method might be used strategically), but to find a way to 
increase one's own power, or the power of one's group, so as to have the 
raw ability to change the law in one's favor with or without the consent of 
II. P. 33 (emphasis added). 
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outsiders. 12 As Farber and Sherry explain, the radical multiculturalist 
argument for affirmative action offers a telling example of this political 
philosophy at work. While liberals worry about how to reconcile 
affirmative action with the general principle of merit that allocates jobs, 
admissions to higher educational institutions, and other social benefits, 
radical multiculturalists experience no such conflict, since to them the 
prevailing conception of merit is itself a form of racist and sexist 
domination. 13 For radical multiculturalists, affirmative action as currently 
conceived does not go nearly far enough to achieve racial justice. In the 
context of law school admissions, for example, radical scholar Richard 
Delgado argues that affirmative action should be replaced with "an 
overhaul of the admissions process and a rethinking of the criteria that 
make a person a deserving law student and future lawyer. "14 Delgado 
makes clear that the proper motivation for overhauling law school admis-
sions is to reallocate the proportion of women and racial minorities 
admitted to law school, irrespective of any criteria based on merit. 15 
Farber and Sherry argue that the radical debunking of merit, 
objectivity, and truth conflicts directly with the political goals the radicals 
say they are fighting for, including the goal of ending racism. 16 For 
example, rejecting merit compels radicals to rely on invidious racial 
stereotypes to explain the social and economic success of two groups that 
have been the victims of widespread discrimination in American 
society-Jews and Asians. As the authors point out, Jews and Asians have 
long outperformed other groups, including white gentiles, on measures 
including economic wealth and educational success. 17 If merit had 
nothing to do with this success, what did? Farber and Sherry make the 
case that a purely power-based view of social achievement compels a racist 
explanation of this success, one that forces multiculturalists to rely on one 
or another of the very myths about Jews and Asians that have historically 
justified discrimination against them. 18 
12. Seep. 118 ("Merit, law, and truth are exercises of power by one group over another. This 
is supposed to be a slogan of liberation-aU the apparent barriers to our heart's desire can be 
overturned, for what lives by power can die by revolution."). 
13. Seep. 47. 
14. P. 47. 
15. P. 49 ("Such a retooling wiiilead to 'a proportionate number of minorities, whites, and 
women gaining admission.'" (quoting Delgado) (citation omitted)). 
16. See p. 52 (suggesting that "the radical attack on merit inevitably has racist and anti-Semitic 
implications"). 
17. P. 59. 
18. Seep. 53 ("[I]f they stick to their theories, the radicals cannot avail themselves of any benign 
explanations for Jewish and Asian success. Instead, they wiii ultimately be forced to resort to modem 
versions of ancient anti-Semitic or racist myths." (emphasis in original)). See generally pp. 52-71. 
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Next, the radical attack on objectivity produces related, but 
distinguishable, difficulties when imported into the political sphere. As an 
example of such difficulties, the authors explore the so-called storytelling 
movement in legal scholarship. Rejecting the traditional scholarly 
approach, which relies on persuading through rational, impersonal 
argument that focuses on attention to what is being said rather than who is 
saying it, radical multiculturalists frequently present their legal and political 
arguments in the form of purportedly personal stories. The work of 
Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Patricia Williams exemplifies this form 
of scholarship, 19 which depends on creating an intuitive "flash of 
recognition" among readers rather than on engaging their capacity for 
rational deliberation. 20 One problem is that this intuitive approach often 
ignores or implicitly discounts contrary facts that may interfere with the 
reader's intuitive "flash." Farber and Sherry report, for example, that 
while widely read examples of legal storytelling strongly suggest that 
minority law teaching candidates do not do as well as whites in the hiring 
market, the facts demonstrate the contrary conclusion-that minority 
candidates are substantially more likely to get law teaching jobs than are 
white candidates.21 Because they deny readers the chance to "work out" 
analytically the factual complexities of an argument, stories written to 
reinforce the dangers of racism often have the effect of ignoring or even 
erasing such complexities.22 
A related problem with the storytelling method is that it produces 
struggles over authenticity and "voice," both within a particular group and 
between that group and others, that make productive dialogue about diffe-
rences either difficult or impossible. 23 Because radical multiculturalists 
discount objective facts and the dialogic potential of rational debate-which 
are the basis of the liberal method for transcending difference and 
achieving political progress-their conceptual disagreements frequently 
degenerate into personal attacks on other scholars, either inside or outside 
19. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1985); 
DELGADO, supra note 4; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991). 
20. See, e.g., p. 77. 
21. P. 77 ("About half of all new [law] faculty are hired through the [Association of American 
Law Schools] hiring conference. Whites who participate in this process are only about half as likely 
to end up with faculty positions as are minority participants. Among faculty who are hired outside of 
the AALS process, the percentage of positions filled by minorities is even higher. Other statistics show 
that the percentage of black women on Jaw school faculties is much higher than the percentage of black 
women lawyers."). 
22. P. 39 ("[C]ritics have been concerned about the risk that stories can distort legal debate, parti-
cularly if those stories are atypical, inaccurate, or incomplete."). 
23. See pp. 78-84 (giving examples of the conflict between commentators purporting to represent 
a particular group and other members of that group who take issue with the representations made about 
the group). 
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their group.24 Within a world view that privileges context and personal 
experience over objective rules of argument, disagreements over ideas lead 
almost inexorably to mutual accusations of bad faith and betrayal. 
Needless to say, such attacks do nothing to advance the fight for racial and 
gender equality; on the contrary, they divert the energies and talents of 
these scholars from continuing that fight.25 
Finally, Farber and Sherry argue that the radical rejection of truth as 
a basis for political and legal debate makes it impossible to distinguish 
good from evil in politics and thus commits the radicals to accepting all 
political arrangements as equally legitimate, be they liberal democracies or 
totalitarian dictatorships. 26 
It is no surprise that the end product of radical multiculturalism 
has affinities with totalitarianism. As part of the attack on the 
Enlightenment, the critique of truth suffers from a tendency to 
reinforce pre-Enlightenment despotism. The Enlightenment replaced 
individual and institutional power with more objective measures of 
validity, and it is no surprise that the rejection of objectivity 
collapses back into power as the means for defining absolute truth. 
Indeed, Foucault himself may have recognized this tendency, 
apparently implicitly applauding (as the kind of transformative 
politics engendered by his theoretical approach) two of the most 
totalitarian regimes of the late twentieth century. . . . [Foucault] 
gives indications of supporting both the Chinese Cultural Revolution 
of the early 1970s and the Iranian fundamentalist revolution of the 
late 1970s. 27 
The radical multiculturalist rejection of truth makes it impossible to 
condemn even the most horrific acts of government, for example the Nazi 
Holocaust. If there is no such thing as a true, objectively "right" political 
value, if all politics and political systems are entirely the result of struggles 
for power and domination among different and morally indistinguishable 
groups, then no basis exists on which to condemn the Holocaust as evil and 
to insist that democracy is better. Farber and Sherry argue that the 
"radical multiculturalist dismissal of the possibility of objective truth is 
fraught with peril" because it allows for no possibility of agreement on 
universal political truths. 28 Without such agreement, "there is no way to 
mediate among truth claims except by recourse to authoritarian fiat" and 
24. Pp. 80-81 (describing the personal nature and highly confrontational tone of the responses by 
some radical multiculturalists to commentators who express contrasting viewpoints). 
25. Pp. 78-84. 
26. P. 105 ("[M]oral relativism ultimately has no defenses against totalitarianism and other 
dehumanizing regimes." (quoting Richard Rorty)). 
27. P. 106 (citation omitted). 
28. P. 117. 
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no way to distinguish among various forms of political authority except by 
reference to their power. 29 
Political progress, including progress toward racial and gender 
equality, requires agreement about values as well as the political power to 
implement them. Farber and Sherry make a convincing case that the 
philosophical tenets of radical multiculturalism-in particular its rejection 
of truth, merit, and objectivity as legitimate bases for progressive political 
debate-necessarily imply that no transcendent political values exist, that 
there is no objective basis in fact or in theory on which to ground such 
values, and that any attempt to do so is simply a power play designed ulti-
mately to place or maintain in power the group that attempts to invoke such 
values. The authors follow radical multiculturalist philosophy out to its 
logical conclusions, compare those conclusions to the political goals 
radicals say they advocate, and find the conclusions and goals to be directly 
in conflict. 30 
As an internal critique of radical multiculturalist political philosophy, 
Farber and Sherry's methods seem fair, their arguments clear, and their 
conclusions persuasive. Yet one is left with the sense that the authors have 
failed to come to grips with some of the most interesting and important 
questions about the assumptions underlying radical multiculturalist theory. 
The balance of this review is devoted to an exploration of different short-
comings in Beyond All Reason's critique. In Part II, Professor Alces 
suggests that Farber and Sherry provide a technically proficient formal 
critique of radical multiculturalism without asking whether multiculturalist 
theory, even taken at its word, is relevant or useful to the study and 
practice of law in the real world. This, Professor Alces concludes, is the 
real weakness of the book. In Part ill, Professor Ward argues to the 
contrary that Farber and Sherry's criticisms are well~founded and go to the 
heart of multiculturalist theory and its practical limitations. Hov,.:ever, the 
relevance of these criticisms to contemporary legal discourse is undercut 
by the book's failure to consider how radical multiculturalists themselves 
have perceived, explained, and transcended a relatively obvious and 
fundamental disconnect which emerged in earlier multiculturalist works. 
II. Going Beyond Beyond All Reason: Is Radical Multiculturalism 
Relevant to the Practice of Law? 
"Sometimes a concept is baffling not because it is profound but 
because it is wrong. "31 This book presents an opportunity for scholars 
29. P. 117. 
30. Pp. 138-43 (concluding that radical multiculturalism itself has anti.Semitic and other discri-
minatory implications). 
31. EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSIUENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 249 (1998). 
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who do not generally dabble in the radical but distrust it from afar to read 
a critique of the movement written by those who have taken it seriously. 
Professors Farber and Sherry are public law scholars who have perused the 
radical multiculturalist canon (the irony there is intentional),32 and who 
themselves write careful doctrinal scholarship (of the type that the most 
traditional scholars would value).33 As a formal critique of radical 
multiculturalism, Farber and Sherry's work makes a devastating case 
against at least, the extremes of the radical multiculturalist jurisprudence. 
This portion of the review uses a realistic perspective derived from the 
work of Karl Llewellyn to identify the shortcomings of Beyond All Reason 
as a critique of radical multiculturalism, and then to describe the real 
failure of radical multiculturalism itself as a school of legal thought. 
A. A Perspective 
Those with different scholarly perspectives make differing demands on 
the legal literature, looking more favorably upon scholarship that realizes 
what they value and responding less favorably to work that does not meet 
the qualifications of their own work. For a substantial portion of the 
scholarly legal community, radical multiculturalist scholarship is not 
important. Not only is it not important, it is a distraction from the serious 
work that should be the province of lawyers, including academic lawyers, 
and a waste of pages in the most prestigious journals that would be better 
devoted to scholarship that "matters. "34 A less charitable view of the 
genre might be even more damning: Radical scholarship is irresponsible 
and given to prevarication; at its best, it is merely sloppy. 35 Yet the 
radical multicultural literature that Farber and Sherry appraise has been 
taken quite seriously by a significant portion of the academy. Were that 
not the case, it would not appear in the prestigious journals in which it 
appears, its proponents would not have earned tenure and promotion at the 
nation's leading law schools, and Farber and Sherry probably would not 
have found it worthwhile to study. There must be something there. So it 
32. Pp. 11-12, 16. 
33. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Coun Irrelevant?: Reflections on the Judicial Role 
in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1997); Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as 
a Learning Experience, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, Beyond the Roe Debate: 
Judicial Experience with the 1980's "Reasonableness" Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519 (1990); Daniel A. 
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CoNsr. COMMENTARY 257 (1996); Suzanna 
Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilemma: The Baseline Question, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 865 (1998); 
Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 1260 (1990). 
34. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). 
35. See Pp. 13940 (concluding that radical multicultural theozy involves anti-Semetic implications 
and other, more immediate, nroblems): see also infra text accorunanvin!!: notes 70-73. 
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is worthwhile to ask whether there is a point to the radical multiculturalist 
critique that the scholar who cares and writes about the operation of 
fundamental commercial law conceptions, for example, should appreciate. 
To pursue that inquiry, we must identify the criteria which will be used to 
evaluate the worth of radical multiculturalism and determine whether 
Farber and Sherry have assessed radical theory's performance in light of 
these criteria. 
These criteria should be based on a frame of reference that is not 
atypical and that captures the source of the traditional scholar's36 
uneasiness with the radical argument and method. 
Karl Llewellyn distinguished between "'Jurisprudence for the 
Hundred': ... the more esoteric [legal] tradition of the writers about the 
writers and for the writers. . . . not in the language or in the general 
tradition of professional philosophy,"37 and "'Jurisprudence for the 
Hundred Thousand': for the Bar in daily living, and for the citizen who is 
willing to take a moment to ponder. "38 He viewed Jurisprudence for the 
Hundred as "particular[ly] incongru[ous]," "simply 'nonsense,'" and 
"utterly indefensible. "39 He urged lawyers to "avoid abstruse theory" and 
to remember that "[g]ood theory cuts ice. "40 "[T]he wider and deeper a 
man's grasp of theory which does work, the more effective his own work 
can be . . . . "41 Ultimately, scholarship must matter; it has important 
work to do; it must be ameliorative.42 Llewellyn and his realist contem-
poraries would have had little patience with scholarly terrorism, or work 
that is titillating but essentially insubstantial. From this perspective, to the 
extent that Farber and Sherry reveal the radical perspective as insubstantial, 
those scholars whose work and appreciation of legal matters is informed by 
a concern for practical relevance will have no reason to credit the radical 
perspective. But do Farber and Sherry make the case that radical scholar-
ship cannot meet expectations that it should meet in order to be more than 
titillating? 
36. Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Troth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. 
REV. 889, 960·61 (1992) (recognizing that in evaluating legal scholarship diverging from the main-
stream it is necessary to place such theory within a familiar frame of reference or context). 
37. Karl Llewellyn, Extracts from Law in Our Society: A Horse-Sense Theory of the Institution 
of Law (1950), in WILLIAM TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALisr MOVEMENT 499 (1973). 
38. ld. at 500. Llewellyn also distinguished a third level of analysis, "'Jurisprudence for the 
Hundred Million'" which encompassed "the guts of Jurisprudence," not relevant here. ld. 
39. ld. at 499. 
40. ld. at 500. 
41. ld. 
42. See id. at 173 (noting that Llewellyn "regularly emphasized that jurisprudence has an important 
practical role to perform"). 
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B. Farber and Sherry's Attack on Radical Multiculturalism 
Beyond All Reason takes the radical multiculturalists at their word: 
The object of the radical critics is to enfranchise the disenfranchised by 
revealing the vacuity of prevailing conceptions of truth and merit, to reveal 
that naked power determines the distribution of the benefits the law and 
society can bestow, and to reveal that those of us who fail to appreciate 
that circumstance are fools or conspirators. Granted, shorthand description 
of the radical agenda is simplistic. But the formulation suffices to support 
review of Farber and Sherry's theses. 
The radical attack on the neutrality of merit, and similar challenges to 
liberal argument, resonate on at least two levels: First, the terms and tenor 
of the attack are provocative; the charge gets your attention. It has the 
ring of invective, triggering the type of defensive reaction that could 
provoke the "The lady doth protest too much, me thinks "43 response. 
Second, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, 44 it functions as a 
rational argument, albeit a relatively ineffective rational argument, 
comparing the one thing to the other in order to posit the incongruity of the 
contrast as well as the inevitability of the reader's bias. 
This characterization of the radical critique suggests radical scholars 
might have grounds to complain that their movement has been misappre-
ciated and misconstrued, actually sold short, unless Beyond All Reason 
fairly comprehends the method to the radicals' madness.45 To determine 
whether the radical multiculturalists ultimately advance the literature in 
terms not appreciated by Farber and Sherry, it is worthwhile to examine 
four aspects of their critique using, as an example, the work of Patricia 
Williams referred to in their book. These four aspects deal, respectively, 
with the radicals' (1) reaction to the Tawana Brawley incident, (2) legal 
storytelling method of argument, (3) use of extraneous narrative detail, and 
(4) lack of attention to factual accuracy in their own work. 
1. The Tawana Brawley Tragedy.-The circumstances surrounding the 
Tawana Brawley incident are recounted by Farber and Sherry in order to 
43. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2, I. 230, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE (G. 
Blakemore Evans, ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974). 
44. See p. 33 ("Reason is just another code word for the views of the privileged."). 
45. Precisely because of the nature of the radical criticism of traditional legal scholarship, this 
possibility must be of particular concern to anyone attempting to construct an internal critique of radical 
multiculturalism. If the radical multiculturalists who would take issue with the Farber and Sheny 
conclusions are able to demonstrate that Beyond All Reason's exposition of the radical position is 
inaccurate or picks too much on the nits while ignoring substance, then radical apologists could, 
perhaps accurately, charge that Farber and Sheny 's critique, wittingly or unwittingly, marginalizes the 
radical critique in order to exclude more effectively those whose causes the critical scholars champion. 
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provide a concrete and accessible context for Beyond All Reason's critique 
of the radical multiculturalists' reaction to the incident. 
[Tawana Brawley was] a fifteen-year-old black girl who claimed she 
was abducted, raped, tortured, and ultimately smeared with feces by 
a group of white men, including a state district attorney and two 
police officers . . . . [These claims were later revealed to be false.] 
To fortify her illusion, she carved racial epithets into her clothing 
and wrote them across her chest with a burned cloth, then smeared 
dog excrement into her hair and on her body. 46 
The incident was provocative; it was difficult not to react to both the 
original accusation and the subsequent revelation that the charges were a 
fabrication without feeling a sense of moral outrage. The episode had 
some value as a measure of public sentiment and bias: Remember how you 
reacted when you first heard of the alleged attack, and then how you 
reacted when you learned it was a hoax? 
Farber and Sherry recount the radical multiculturalist response to the 
episode; their reaction to the radical response comprises a good deal of 
Beyond All Reason's defense of truth. To support their critique, Farber 
and Sherry focus on the argument of Professor Patricia Williams, 47 
particularly Williams's assertion that "Tawana Brawley has been the victim 
of some unspeakable crime . . . . No matter who did it to her-and even 
if she did it to herself. Her condition was clearly the expression of some 
crime against her, some tremendous violence, some great violation that 
challenges comprehension. "48 Farber and Sherry interpret Williams to be 
arguing that "whether it was true or false, Tawana Brawley's story tells us 
something about the condition of black women. "49 Then the authors ask 
if it matters whether Tawana Brawley's account was true or false. They 
argue that "[i]ndifference to the distinction between fact and fiction 
minimizes real suffering by implying that it is no worse than imagined or 
self-inflicted suffering. "50 "In what kind of legal system would it make 
no difference whether a woman who claimed that she had been raped was 
telling the truth?"51 "[W]hat would we think of someone . . . who said 
46. P. 95. 
47. P. 96. 
48. P. 96 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 169-70). 
49. P. 96. 
50. P. 96. Cf Peter A. Alces, Toil of the Firestarters, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1707, 1720 (1994) 
(book review) ("Those who charge discrimination must identify something observable in order to shock 
the unconscious out of their torpor and avoid trivializing the charge of discrimination, belittling those 
who have been, are now, and will in the future be victims of real rather than imagined 
discrimination."). 
51. P. 96 (citation omitted) (quoting Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical 
Peiformances in Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1279 (1995)). 
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she didn't care whether it had happened or not?"52 Such a view, Farber 
and Sherry intimate, indicates that the radical conception of truth is 
normatively irresponsible. 
If Williams's conclusion is that the veracity of Brawley's accusations 
is essentially inconsequential, then the Farber and Sherry critique has 
significant force. But there is another plausible construction of Williams's 
"indifference" to the truth that Beyond All Reason may erroneously 
disregard. Perhaps Williams is saying that two alternative constructions of 
the Tawana Brawley incident present themselves: the first, that Tawana 
Brawley was in fact the victim of the attack that she described; the second, 
that a young woman who would level such fictional allegations is deeply 
troubled and may have been driven to the despair or mental imbalance that 
provoked that response because of forces similar to those that made the 
charges plausible in the first instance. 53 These forces might include 
racism, sexism, other social forces, and perhaps even intrafamilial forces 
that others not in the troubled young girl's circumstances could not 
appreciate. 54 The tragedy is certainly different if Brawley were driven to 
her despair by her stepfather, and different again if her fear of him were 
irrational; but in ways that might be valid for the radical critique the 
tragedy of Tawana Brawley is no less a tragedy. It is just a different 
tragedy-an "expression of some crime [or other] against her. "55 
Williams may be wrong; Brawley's fabrication may have been simply 
a crime against others and she may have been the victimizer rather than the 
victim. But this factual scenario does not refute Williams's theoretical 
assertion that the truth of Brawley's accusations was more a matter of 
determining the way in which she was victimized than of determining whe-
ther in fact she was victimized. If Brawley were a victim, as Williams 
asserts she was, then when we concern ourselves with the factual truth of 
her allegations we are only quibbling about the manifestation of her 
victimhood. Farber and Sherry may be reading Williams superficially. 
Farber and Sherry themselves offer a construction of Williams that 
approaches: "[i]n other words, whether [Brawley's story] was true or false, 
[it] tells us something about the condition of black women. "56 In doing 
so, they reveal a shortcoming of their own critique: if Beyond All Reason's 
arguments are to be convincing, the authors must afford the objects of their 
criticism every benefit of the doubt, something they have not done here. 
52. P. 96. 
53. Cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 175-76 (writing that truth "takes on a life of its own ••• 
untruth becomes truth through belief, and disbelief untruths the truth"). 
54. See id. at 167-68 (describing the "personality slaughter" of a child by her family, in which 
case the child becomes a "public mirror" of the unhealthy family). 
55. P. 96 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 170). 
56. P. 96. 
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In focusing on the importance of the veracity of Brawley's account 
Farber and Sherry miss an opportunity to level a more compelling critique 
of the radical perspective. The most provocative aspect of Patricia 
Williams's conclusion that Tawana Brawley was a victim must be the fact 
that we do not know for sure what it is that Brawley was a victim of, or 
how tangentially, if at all, her victimhood is related to her accusations. 
Even assuming that invidious forces beyond her control drove Brawley to 
do what she did, we need to know what those forces were and how they 
affected the young woman the way they did. 
Williams has no clear point. If Williams intended to formulate a 
conclusion about the law, then those who would pursue legal inquiry would 
want to know how the law caused the Brawley tragedy. If Williams 
intends instead to pose questions that go beyond legal analysis, then we 
would want to know what social science or philosophical inquiry 
corresponds to Williams's assertion. It may be that Williams and other 
radical scholars who pose searching questions by way of provocative 
epithet do not have a sense of where we are to look for answers and may 
not e~en ask the question in ways that accommodate further inquiry. 
Perhaps if Williams offered a clearer critique we might conclude that the 
forces that acted on Brawley act on a broader cross section of society. 
Why would we believe that the forces that acted upon Tawana Brawley do 
not affect other young black women, or other young women, or other 
women in general? They might even be akin to forces that operate on old 
white men, white men, or men generally, but just manifest their power in 
different ways, such as through embezzlement rather than through filing a 
false police report. 
Legal scholars are not competent to make judgments about the univer-
sality of irrational reactions to powerful forces-that is not our province. 
And it is Williams's and other critical scholars' apparent zeal for lobbing 
legal Molotov cocktails that compromises the radical critique from the 
perspective of legal scholars who believe that intellectual honesty and 
responsibility require more. The problem is not that we cannot understand · 
what Williams means when she draws broad conclusions from the Tawana 
Brawley accusations. The problem is that Williams does not advance the 
inquiry she so provocatively presents. If the object of radical scholars is 
to force us to confront the absurdity of the human condition, they may 
have nothing to add to Ecclesiastes. 57 
2. "Once Upon a Time .... "-Farber and Sherry also take issue 
with the radical multiculturalists' use of storytelling to make social and 
57. See Ecclesiastes 1:2 (Old American Standard) ("Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher; vanity 
of vanities, all is vanity."). 
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legal arguments. In a portion of Beyond All Reason that must surely cause 
radical multiculturalists to conclude that Farber and Sherry simply "do not 
get it, "58 the book presents "The Story"59 and then "The Story behind 
the Story. "60 Sherry relates a misleadingly provocative, but factually 
accurate, story of her early life and then corrects the misperceptions the 
rendition would elicit from the average reader. It is not necessary to 
recount the differences between the two versions here. It is enough to take 
Sherry's word for it that, at least on one level, "by putting forth to others 
a self that isn't accurate, the storyteller lets dishonesty poison any dialogue 
she might have with the larger community. In telling this kind of story, 
one's integrity as a person is at stake. "61 The author is certainly correct 
that, were we to assume the veracity of the first version of her story, draw 
conclusions from that rendition about the storyteller, and then later learn 
that the story was a hoax or at least very misleading, we would have good 
reason to question the efficacy of the arguments presented by the story. 
But it is rare that we are concerned with the truth of the matters 
asserted in the course of an autobiography by a legal scholar. While it 
might be that we care whether the scholar is accurately recounting facts as 
facts, the whole object of legal argument is to present the facts in a manner 
most considerate of your side's position without losing credibility in the 
eyes of the fact finder. That is a point driven home in first-year appellate 
advocacy exercises. Even more importantly, however, our concern with 
stories as legal analysis should be with whether there is a resonance of 
truth in the story and whether the story elicits reactions that get us closer 
to an understanding that we did not have before we read the story. 
Ultimately, it does not matter whether the story is objectively true if its 
object is to provoke a reaction to its social and political plausibility. So 
appreciated, Farber and Sherry's inability to come to terms with the truth 
of legal storytelling, rather than its factual accuracy, misses the point in the 
same way that their critique of Patricia Williams's assertions with regard 
to the Tawana Brawley incident falls short. 
That is not to say, however, that there is not a glaring deficiency that 
is common to a great deal of legal storytelling. There is nothing obvious 
in the training of legal educators or in the sheltered day-to-day existence 
of those who teach law that would lead us to conclude that this group can 
tell a poignant legal story more effectively than could, say, Richard 
58. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, C'est Moi, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1619, 1630-36 (1999) (evaluating 
Sheny and Farber's treatment of Sheny's memoirs and its impact on their ability to evaluate Brawley's 
story). 
59. P. 112. 
60. P. 113. 
61. Pp. 116-17. 
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Wright62 or Harper Lee. 63 Those who are skeptical of the contributions 
of legal storytellers may well question whether the writers who try to 
capture legal argument in law review fiction are particularly skilled at the 
enterprise. You do not have to be too cynical to conclude that the law 
professors whose "scholarship" consists of legal storytelling should have 
their contributions judged, once they deal as loosely with the objective 
truth as Farber and Sherry suggest they do, by literary standards. The 
result of applying that type of judgment, from the perspective of those with 
a respect for real literature, may well be the determination that, as fiction, 
legal storytelling is generally not very good and not as likely to change the 
way we think as the works of truly great writers of fiction are. 
Farber and Sherry's focus on the fictional nature of the genre would 
seem to be subject to the response that they fail to appreciate the literary 
bent of the storytellers. The real problem may not be that we cannot tell 
where fact ends and fiction begins; the problem may be that we are not 
moved by the stories themselves. While part of the problem with the 
stories is that they seem incredible, one sided, and unreliable, what we are 
really saying when we level such criticisms is that the stories are, on the 
whole, not very good and not effective in the way good literature is 
effective. 
3. Extraneous Narratives.-Those who write careful doctrinal 
scholarship typically pore over primary and secondary sources to compose 
an argument that will advance the legal literature. Notwithstanding the 
grandiose claims of law review article titles, few paradigms shift. When 
they do, it is more often than not the courts that shift paradigms and legal 
scholars who react. 64 The fundamental question for the radical literature 
is whether the radical multiculturalists have shifted paradigms, or even 
made incremental advances in the legal literature. 
Farber and Sherry clearly have something to say about this in Beyond 
All Reason, but again their argument seems to be camouflaged in their 
62. See, e.g., RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON (1940) (recounting the tale of a young African-
American man living in the slums of Chicago's South Side). 
63. See, e.g., HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960) (chronicling one girl's experiences 
during the racially charged trial of a young black man in mid-twentieth-century Alabama). 
64. See, e.g., Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 
62 U. COLO. L. REv. l, 7 (1991); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: 
Understanding "Rejection, n 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 874 (1988); Vern Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 447-48 (1973) (all identifying the 1938 
Chandler Act amendments to the Bankmptcy Act of 1898, inspired by Copeland v. Stevens, 106 Eng. 
Rep. 218 (K.B. 1818) and Capitol Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U.S. 581 (1916), as 
shifting paradigms of bankruptcy law); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory 
Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 907-10 (1985) 
(discussing modem courts' greater willingness to enforce contracts under a theory of promissory 
estoppel); Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv. 687 (1990) 
(tracing the decline of· 
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critique of the radical treatment of truth. One can sense Farber and 
Sherry's impatience with the radicals in their selection of one particular 
quotation of Williams's. After seeing a news item about Harvard's failure 
(or inability) to add an African-American woman to its law faculty, 
Williams reports: 
So now you know: it is this news item, as I sit propped up in bed 
with my laptop computer balanced on my knees, clad in my robe 
with the torn fringe of terry bluebells, that finally pushes me over the 
edge and into the deep rabbit hole of this book. 65 
This experience led Williams to conclude that law schools continue to 
discriminate against minorities. 66 
Farber and Sherry take issue with the accuracy of Williams's 
conclusions. African Americans, Farber and Sherry contend, are actually 
favored-not disfavored-by the law school faculty hiring process. 67 For 
Farber and Sherry, a critique that ignores that "truth" is deficient. But if 
Farber and Sherry are really interested in demonstrating the deficiencies in 
Williams's argument, why do they not reproduce a portion of her book in 
which she makes the argument that they attribute to her? Why do they 
quote her account of how she came to write The Alchemy of Race and 
Rights? What is it in Williams's account of her revelation upon watching 
the McNeil-Lehrer Report describe Harvard's failure to hire an African-
American woman that troubles Farber and Sherry? If it is just Williams's 
conclusion that is erroneous, why do Farber and Sherry reproduce 
Williams's description of the circumstances when the scales fell from her 
eyes? It would seem that the quotation Farber and Sherry lift from 
Alchemy is designed to ridicule Williams's prose and style as insipid, 
sophomoric, and ultimately unconvincing. 
The Farber and Sherry critique of Williams's reaction to the Harvard 
appointments process could be more effective, and offer a richer legal 
analysis, if Farber and Sherry were more forthcoming. The reader would 
like to see Farber and Sherry take issue with Williams's presentation more 
directly by questioning whether Williams's realism is effective or too 
immature to be important legal scholarship and too silly to be taken 
seriously. In the interest of intellectual advancement, as well as critical 
honesty, it would be better to challenge the best case that can be made on 
behalf of Williams's style of scholarship.68 On a substantive level, it 
65. P. 76 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 5). 
66. See WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 47-48, 84-90 (implying through the narration of personal 
experiences that law reviews and law school exams discriminate against minorities). 
67. See supra note 21. 
68. See generally Cynthia V. Ward, Toward Cantankerous Community, 3 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 249, 275 (1997) (praising Williams's use of the "power of empathy" to stimulate 
dialogue among different groups of people "despite profound, enduring, and perhaps even permanent 
differences"). 
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would be preferable to see Farber and Sherry consider Williams's perspec-
tive more directly and honestly. The authors of Beyond All Reason must 
find something curious in the complaints of a Columbia Law School profes-
sor who started teaching at Golden Gate University School of Law, moved 
to CUNY at Queens, and then continued at Wisconsin before joining the 
faculty at Columbia. 69 Few law professors can match that type of upward 
mobility. The course of Williams's career surely indicates that any 
deficiency she discovers is at most with Harvard rather than with the legal 
academy's attitude toward affirmative action and the intellectual strength 
of people of color generally. It is likely that the irony of Williams's 
complaint is not lost on Farber and Sherry. It is unclear, then, why they 
do not make the point directly in their response to Williams. 
4. Good Scholarship Is Hard to Do: The Consequences of 
Carelessness.-Finally, in some parts of their critique, Farber and Sherry 
adopt an unconvincing, anecdotal approach to argue that radical works 
evince disregard for the truth. The style of the multiculturalists confirms 
for the authors of Beyond All Reason that legal storytelling lacks the rigor 
and discipline that distinguish the best scholarship. 70 They infer from the 
sloppiness of Williams, for example, that the multiculturalists harbor a 
contempt for truth as the majority of the academic world conceives it: 
Williams . . . states that "through the first part of the century" the 
U.S. Supreme Court had upheld "a state's right to forbid blacks to 
testify against whites." This is a rather shocking assertion, but the 
typical reader would probably feel safe in relying on this legal claim 
by a Columbia professor specializing in race law. But Williams's 
claim is false. Since 1866, federal law has entitled blacks to testify 
in court on the same terms as whites. The only case Williams cites 
to support her assertion was decided in 1871 , not in "the first part of 
the century. "71 
The authors attribute Williams's error to "casualness about truth[,] 
. . . legal doctrine and the historical record. "72 In fact, if the example 
Farber and Sherry cite is not an isolated one, it would seem that Williams 
is not a very conscientious scholar. On the other hand, if the example 
69. See Columbia Law School Homepage (visited December 18, 1999) <http://www.law. 
columbia.edu/faculty/pwilliams.html > 
70. Seep. 39 (including themselves among critics who "have called for greater care and rigor in 
the use of narratives within the framework of scholarly analysis"); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 58-63. 
71. P. 100 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at47, 242 n.3); see also Civil Rights Act of1866, 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (guaranteeing blacks the right to enter into contracts, to sue and be sued, and 
to testify in court). 
72. P. 100. 
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cited by Farber and Sherry is isolated, then Farber and Sherry may be 
straining to make a point about Williams's and radical multiculturalists' 
contempt for truth as most of us conceive it. 
You get the sense from the Farber and Sherry correction of Williams's 
misreport of the law that, again, Beyond All Reason is really attacking 
something other than what it purports to attack. Farber and Sherry 
probably think that Williams is a negligent, perhaps reckless, scholar, but 
they do not assert this. If this were the substance of the Farber and Sherry 
criticism, they would need to offer many more examples of her inattention. 
Instead, it is, in a way, easier to accuse Williams of the more fundamental 
deficiency, a contempt for truth, and use an isolated incident to confirm 
that conclusion, than it is to acknowledge that Williams may simply have 
erred. A single deliberate lie is more likely to be viewed as a reflection 
on a person's character than a single mistake. In either case, just as when 
Farber and Sherry reproduce the insipid bathrobe account, 73 they have 
attacked a weak link and attached to it significance in a manner that it is 
appropriate to question. 
C. Traditionalists' Unease with the Growing Irrelevance of Legal 
Scholarship 
If the greatest deficiency of multiculturalism is its proponents' inability 
to describe accurately and fairly the status quo, a response that corrects the 
radicals' misperception and misrepresentation is certainly helpful, but such 
a response to the multiculturalists still fails to address the fundamental 
deficiencies in the radical multiculturalists' approach to matters legal. 
Ultimately, all that Beyond All Reason does is demonstrate that some 
radical multiculturalists misrepresent verifiable facts in some of their work. 
Farber and Sherry do not address the following three problems with radical 
multiculturalist theory that are probably of the greatest concern to 
traditional, doctrinal scholars with relatively practical objectives: its 
irrelevance to the overwhelming bulk of legal practice and study, its failure 
to offer prescriptions for social ills, and its disconnection from the natural 
sciences that are the appropriate foundation for anthropological and 
metaphysical assertions of the type the radicals wish to make. 
1. Irrelevance of the Radical Critique.-For those who toil with the 
mysteries and majesty of what they refer to as "real" law, it may be easy 
to ignore radical scholarship as unconscientious legal inquiry. It is difficult 
to discern the point of scholarship that will not tell you how to close a real 
estate deal, document a loan, or get your client out on bail that she can 
73. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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afford. The philosophical ratiocinations of the multiculturalists may be of 
more interest to sociologists, psychologists, and theologians than to those 
who teach the law to students who need to know where to stand in court 
so that they will be able to repay their student loans. The subject matter 
of the radical perspective amounts to only the most modest sliver of the 
law school curriculum, and an even finer slice of the practice of law. The 
skeptic could question expending so much intellectual energy on developing 
the radical perspective of law students who may not know the difference 
between a check and a money order. This omission is a missed oppor-
tunity by Farber and Sherry. The academy's preoccupation with the radi-
cal left (and perhaps with "law and ... " movements generally) has made 
legal education increasingly irrelevant to the lives of all but the smallest 
group of lawyers, most of whom will enter the academy. Regardless of 
what one may think of the radical perspective, it is imperative that those 
who offer a critique of multiculturalism come to terms with the 
scholarship's relationship to the practice of law. 
2. Questions Without Answers.-Even were the radical description of 
existing social, legal, and political imbalances (real or perceived) coherent, 
which Farber· and Sherry dispute, Beyond All Reason does not address the 
radical multiculturalists' failure to offer a coherent, reality-based 
prescription. 
For doctrinal scholars, the carelessness of radical commentators is 
troublesome. But perhaps a greater and more fundamental problem with 
the radical perspective remains once the factual inaccuracies are revealed-
the failure of radical commentators to prescribe a legal cure for the real 
social inequities that remain after the radical obfuscation is revealed. For 
at least some doctrinal scholars, that failure is the greatest shortcoming of 
the radical critique. 74 It is not that traditionalists, those who focus on the 
operation and cooperation of legal mechanisms and trust those mechanisms 
to respond to injustice, are simply indifferent to radical protestations. 
Indeed, even the most conscientious scholars would probably be willing to 
discount the radicals' factual errors and focus instead on a radical argument 
that intelligently comes to terms with real miscarriages of justice. 
Farber and Sherry do not engage the radical critique on this level. 
They settle, instead, for what amounts to intellectual proofreading. The 
question we want Farber and Sherry to ask is whether the game is worth 
the candle. More important than whether a particular radical scholar has 
74. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. 
L. REV. 1157, 1184-85 (1991) (stating that while radical commentators "emphasize the importance of 
differences between cultural groups, these commentators generally discuss only the ways in which the 
special strengths of historically subordinated groups have been inadequately appreciated" and "[f]ew 
discuss directly what the appropriate response should be"). 
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gotten her facts right is whether, once we get the facts right, the radical 
perspective has told us anything about the way legal mechanisms and 
institutions should be retooled to respond to real inequity. It is not enough 
for radicals to conclude that economic inequality is a result of the 
concentration of wealth. More helpful would be substantial discourse that 
engages the most fundamental reasons why the social and economic 
aspirations of nearly everyone are at some time frustrated-and how the 
law should be changed to deal with this fact. For many doctrinal scholars, 
the invective of radical scholars is a tragedy because it is essentially 
vacuous. All the Farber and Sherry critique offers, ultimately, is a 
response to the sum but not the substance of factual inaccuracy. 
3. Nonscientific Basis ofthe Radical Critique.-IfFarber and Sherry 
had engaged the radical critique directly, Beyond All Reason could have 
explored the fundamental flaw of overly ambitious legal commentary, or 
for that matter, all social commentary, that proposes to reduce human 
interrelations to the head of the hegemony pin. Edward 0. Wilson 
described the substance of that type of intellectual error in his recent book 
Consilience, which posits the reality of the unity of knowledge but 
expresses extreme skepticism that social scientists have succeeded in 
revealing the basic contours of that fundamental unity: 
The full underr.tanding of utility will come from biology and 
psychology by reduction to the elements of human behavior followed 
by bottom-up synthesis, not from the social sciences by top-down 
inference and guesswork based on intuitive knowledge. It is in 
biology and psychology that economists and other social scientists 
will find the premises needed to fashion more predictive models, just 
as it was in physics and chemistry that researchers found premises 
that upgraded biology. 75 
The radical literature is dominated by such top-down inference and guess-
work based on intuitive knowledge.76 The problem, to a significant 
extent, with the radical perspective is that the science of victimology is 
inconsiderate of fundamental biological and psychological premises. 
Rather than engage other branches of intellectual inquiry, the radical 
multiculturalists, at their worst, wrap emotional reaction in the rhetoric of 
intellectual rigor and create diatribe that is more preposterous (because not 
objectively verifiable) than prescient.77 While Farber and Sherry do an 
15. WILSON, supra note 31, at 206. 
76. P. 87 (discussing how radical multiculturalists think that different groups understand the world 
in fundamentally different tenns). 
77. See pp. 95-97 (criticizing Patricia Williams's account of the Tawana Brawley incident as 
unconcerned with whether the incident actuallv hannened): n. 127 ("Defenders of storytelling need only 
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admirable job of depicting the multiculturalists' inability to afford one 
another even the most basic common decencies, 78 Beyond All Reason does 
not come to terms with a more fundamental flaw in the radical program: 
the lack of scientific integrity in the sense Edward Wilson intends. 79 The 
book would have been stronger if Farber and Sherry had spent more time 
treating that flaw in the radical perspective generally instead of criticizing 
the most obviously extreme absurdities of the radical movement in legal 
scholarship. 
4. Conclusion.-Perhaps the salient impression left by reading Beyond 
All Reason is the profound disappointment that radical scholarship has 
preoccupied the highest echelons of the academic community and has main-
tained the attention of very significant intellects, such as Farber and 
Sherry, by generating much more heat than light. Beyond All Reason is a 
contribution to the literature, and not just the legal literature. In sober 
tones the book surveys the radical multiculturalist literature and holds its 
excesses up to the light. But Farber and Sherry do not delve as deeply as 
we might like into the incongruities of the radical critique; they take aim 
at only the largest (easiest) targets, and too often settle on the more 
egregious but least substantial failures of the radical literature. A reader 
could have expected much more of Beyond All Reason, given the talent and 
stature of the book's authors. The book leaves the conscientious student 
of the legal literature wondering whether Farber and Sherry missed some-
thing that would have made their response to the radical critique more 
effective. 
point out that the challengers necessarily assume the very concepts of objectivity and truth that the 
storytellers are attacking. The critique of truth is peculiarly immune-after all, by what standard could 
one judge a critique of truth itself to be 'false'?"); p. 137 (arguing that radical multiculturalists "can 
explain away any seemingly adverse evidence, because they know in advance that it cannot be valid," 
which "makes genuine intellectual engagement with outsiders difficult"). 
78. See, e.g., p. 14 ("[W]e have a strong distaste for the growing incivility of academic 
disputes."); pp. 89-90 (relating unfriendly and uncivil exchanges among radicals on a personal, face-to-
face level); pp. 90-94 (recounting a rancorous debate between two prominent figures in critical legal 
studies and radical theory-Mark Tushnet and Gary Peller-regarding a work by Patricia Williams). 
79. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 31, at 11 ("Given that human action comprises events of 
physical causation, why should the social sciences and humanities be impervious to consilience with 
the namral sciences?"); id. at 12 ("The [mind] is the same for both enterprises, for science and the arts, 
and there is a general explanation of its origin and nature and thence of the human condition, 
proceeding from the deep history of genetic evolution to modem culture."); id. at 53-54 (defining 
science and its characteristics and contrastiug it with nonscience); id. at 183 ("[N]ever ... have social 
scientists been able to embed their narrative in the physical realities of human biology and psychology 
.... "); id. at 188 ("[T]he social sciences are intrinsically compatible with the natural sciences. The 
two great branches of learning will benefit to the extent that their modes of causal explanation are 
consistent."); pp. 39-40 ("Radical feminists ... thus reject the linearity, abstraction, and scientific 
objectivity of rational argument."). 
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III. Deconstructing Radical Multiculturalism: Has It Anticipated the 
Farber and Sherry Critique? 
In his provocative attack on the argument of Beyond All Reason, 
Professor Alces concludes that Farber and Sherry have failed to capitalize 
on their opportunity to expose the most fundamental defects of radical 
multiculturalist theory. Professor Alces suggests that the authors' selective 
quotation from radical writings, and their failure to extend interpretive 
charity to those writings, steer them toward condemnations of radical 
multiculturalism that do not hold up under thoughtful analysis. I want first 
to respond to what I take to be Professor Alces's two main examples of 
this failure-Farber and Sherry's critique of radical storytelling as a method 
of legal analysis, and their attack on what they see as the radicals' 
disregard for truth-by defending the thesis of Beyond All Reason in both 
respects. However, I will then move on to discuss Farber and Sherry's 
argument in the context of the most recent developments in radical legal 
theory. I argue that the core theoretical problem the authors isolate in 
radical theory-that such theory can never produce a system of law that 
advances the cause of social justice-is becoming a nonissue in the context 
of the most recent radical legal scholarship, which reintroduces into the 
feminist and critical race lexicon a respect for individual agency and (I 
suggest) for individual rights as a socially progressive means of securing 
such agency to all. 
A. Defending the Central Thesis 
My coauthor argues that Farber and Sherry's attack on the use of 
autobiographical storytelling misses the mark because the authors of 
Beyond All Reason focus too much on whether the stories are true. 
According to Professor Alces, the more appropriate question from the 
radical perspective is whether they are good stories, that is, whether they 
move us enough to question the way we think about the issues they raise, 
such as racism and sexism. 
Professor Alces's argument suggests that there is no point to making 
a story autobiographical; instead, the story should be evaluated purely on 
its literary merit. 80 But why, then, do so many legal storytellers make 
clear that their stories are in fact autobiographical? Surely they mean to 
achieve something by writing a story that says not merely "this is what I 
think," but rather "this is what happened to me." In fact, the addition of 
personal experience to a story almost certainly evinces the writer's desire 
to persuade readers of the objective truth of the story's main argument-for 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63. 
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example, that racism is pervasive in our society. 81 The readers of 
autobiographical stories are meant not only to sympathize with the author 
but to realize through the author's personal experience that racism is real 
and objectively harmful. 82 To deny this is not simply to disagree-it is 
to deny a truth that has been lived by the author. Such denial becomes an 
act of disrespect that may then itself be decried as bigotry. 
The use of autobiographical legal stories drives home Farber and 
Sherry's point about the dramatic contradictions within radical 
multiculturalist theory. As they note repeatedly in Beyond All Reason, the 
substantive point of the radical argument is that objectivity and truth do not 
exist. 83 At the same time, however, the radicals' use of autobiographical 
storytelling seems intended to establish a set of verifiable facts about the 
world-the very basis for argument that radical multiculturalism condemns 
as inherently oppressive. 84 Readers are meant to be persuaded by these 
autobiographical accounts that the author's point of view is true. In the 
context of legal storytelling, they presumably intend to suggest that the 
author's version of truth should become the basis for law and policy. The 
truth of the radical stories therefore does matter within the context of the 
radical enterprise, and their falseness simultaneously exposes and reflects 
the inherent contradictions in radical thought. 
81. See p. 39 ("The new storytellers believe that stories have a persuasive power that transcends 
rntional argument."); Kathryn Abrnms, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1022 (1991) 
(explaining that narratives persuade by "depicting a conflict or event with a vividness that is impossible 
to achieve through abstract expression"); see also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the 
Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2272 (1989) ("When 
someone tells us a story, he or she invites us to enter a constructed world. • • . Our very success in 
understanding the story is simultaneously the narrator's success in persuading us-at least tempornrily-
to imagine the world in a particular way."). 
82. See Abrnms, supra note 81, at 1021 (asserting that "first person agony narratives" are 
persuasive because the pain experienced by the author "encournges readers' assent to her account"); 
Winter, supra note 81, at 2277 (explaining that an audience achieves understanding and empathy 
because it "'lives' the story-experience and is brought personally to engage in the process of construct-
ing meaning out of another's experience"). See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzauna Sherry, Telling 
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (analyzing the role 
of storytelling in legal scholarship). 
83. P. 33. 
84. Seep. 5 ("OtherO [rndical multiculturnlists] attack the concepts of reason and objective truth, 
condemning them as components of white male domination."); p. 26 ("Rationality, objectivity, 
accurncy and standards of intellectual quality and merit are slogans or masks of oppression designed 
to convince the oppressed that subordination is justice." (quoting Neil W. Hamilton)); see also Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., Tmth or Consequences? The Inadequacy of Consequentialist Arguments Against 
Multicultural Relativism, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 185, 190 (1998) (describing as a principle of rndical 
multiculturnlism the view that "objective truth is a white, male, and heterosexual social construction"); 
Frnncis J. Mootz III, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in American Legal 
Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 605, 611 (1998) ("Radical multiculturnlists deny the existence 
of truths about which we can gain knowledge and reject the possibility of developing neutral standards 
by which we can make objective judgments of merit."). 
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Professor Alces also suggests that Farber and Sherry go too far in 
accusing the radical multiculturalists of a total disregard for truth. 85 
Focusing on Patricia Williams's account of the Thwana Brawley debacle, 
Professor Alces argues that Williams's attempt to carry the discussion of 
that incident beyond the truthfulness of Brawley's rape claim may not 
evidence any moral deficiency in the radical critique, but simply a desire 
to reach another kind of truth-the truth that whether or not she lied about 
the rape, "[h]er condition was clearly the expression of some crime against 
her, some tremendous violence, some great violation that challenges 
comprehension. "86 
But Farber and Sherry would almost certainly agree with this 
conclusion. fr1 Their focus here is on what should happen legally in the 
rape case when it becomes apparent that Brawley lied. As Professor Alces 
points out, they make this point by asking (via a quote from Anne 
Coughlin), "In what kind of legal system would it make no difference 
whether a woman who claimed she had been raped was telling the 
truth?"88 In short, Farber and Sherry seem to agree with Professor Alces 
that, whether or not Williams's analysis of the Brawley case "tells us 
something about the condition of black women, "89 it tells us nothing at all 
about how the law should respond when a criminal charge is proven to be 
false. 
From this perspective, the thesis of Beyond All Reason holds up 
against Professor Alces's criticisms that the authors' quotes from radical 
multiculturalist writings are unfair, and that Farber and Sherry have failed 
to explore adequately the various possible interpretations of those writings. 
My own criticism of the book focuses on a quite different weakness, one 
that will become clear from reviewing and reconsidering Farber and 
Sherry's analysis in light of recent and dramatic movement from within the 
theoretical camp they attack. 
B. Radical Theory Reaches a Dead End 
As Farber and Sherry suggest, any justice-based argument that is 
worthy of the name must derive from values that discriminate between 
good and evil in the political context. 90 The radical multiculturalists do, 
in fact, rely on objective truth and rational analysis in demonstrable 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 47-55. 
86. WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 169-70. 
87. See, e.g., p. 97 ("We think readers are entitled to know which type of statement is being 
made, and the radicals' casual attitude towards truth eliminates the distinction."). 
88. P. 96 (citation omitted). 
89. P. 96. 
90. Seep. 119 (stating how radical multiculturalism "defies common sense" because it refuses to 
discriminate between good and hail)_ 
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respects; Indeed, their own analysis, when taken to its logical conclusion, 
mandates a major reconstruction of their philosophical premises. 
Radical theory manifestly assumes the reality of objective truth and 
rationality. Certain core "truths" form the basis for both its diagnosis of 
the ills of American law and society and its remedial proposals. First and 
perhaps fundamentally, when radical multiculturalists make an argument 
for racial equality (however that value is defined) as a matter of justice, 
they necessarily imply that inequality between the races is wrong, is unjust, 
and that striving for equality is a rightful goal. Indeed, political arguments 
for justice and equality are not even coherent in a philosophical context that 
rejects the possibility of transcendent political values. To the extent that 
radical scholars mean it when they speak of racism and sexism as unjust, 
and when they argue in favor of political and legal methods of ending these 
forms of inequality, their arguments necessarily depend on analytically 
prior assumptions about the "rightness" of equality and the "wrongness" 
of inequality. 
As Farber and Sherry point out, radical scholarship invokes a clear 
and unequivocal theory about the nature and origins of civil society, 
according to which the conditions that individual human beings interpret as 
objective "reality," including their societal position and the power relations 
in which they find themselves entangled, are socially constructed by identi-
fiable groups for the benefit of such groups and to the lasting detriment of 
others. 91 "Stated baldly," write Farber and Sherry, "their thesis is that 
reality is socially constructed by the powerful in order to perpetuate their 
own hegemony. "92 
Second, this scholarship implies a belief in certain "truths" about the 
effect of socially constructed environments on human psychology and 
development. Radical feminist scholarship may illustrate these beliefs most 
succinctly. Of the cultural feminist claim that women as a group view the 
world differently-in more relational, care-centered terms-than do men as 
a group,93 the radical feminist explanation is that women have been 
socially constructed to be victims, and that part of this construction has 
involved the creation in individual women of a victim's psychology-a 
psychology primarily focused on pleasing others and on denigrating the 
91. Pp. 23-26. 
92. P. 23. 
93. See p. 87 (noting that such scholars have suggested that the feminine view of the world 
emphasizes caring and emotion, whereas the male view emphasizes rationality, abstraction, and 
objective thinking); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 23 (1991) (explaining that feminists have "disputed the assumption 
that traditionally 'female' traits such as nurturing ability, emotional expression, and empathy are less 
worthy than such traditional 'male' traits as aggression, stoicism, and individual autonomy"). 
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self. 94 Men, on the other hand, have been socially constructed to possess 
autonomous "selves" and to believe that preserving and developing the 
individual self are more important than serving others. 95 In short, power 
constructs personality, and social oppression reproduces itself in the form 
of personal "preferences" that in fact reflect an individual's place in the 
social hierarchy. 
Third, radical theory relies on core assumptions about the specific 
nature of the social hierarchy it critiques. This hierarchy is primarily 
organized along racial and gender lines, 96 with white males at the very top 
and minority females at the very bottom.97 Incorporating the previously 
discussed assumption that power constructs personality, radical theory 
necessarily suggests that the various racial and gender groups share 
perspectives that have resulted from their relative positions in the social 
hierarchy. A corollary of this vision that groups share hierarchy-based 
perspectives is that dominated groups share important interests in their 
various fights for equality, interests that both reflect their socially 
constructed perspectives and can form the basis for group-based political 
and legal remedies. 98 Indeed, Farber and Sherry note that such sharing 
of perspective has been the basis of the claim by some radical scholars to 
speak in a unique "voice of color" that both describes the oppression and 
articulates the legal claims of racial minorities. 99 Similarly, radical 
94. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 109-10 
(1989) (asserting that conditioning to the values of the contemporary feminine stereotype, such as being 
passive, vulnerable, weak, and incompetent, "permeates the upbringing of girls and the images for 
emulation thrust upon women"). 
95. See id. at 89 (asserting that consciousness-raising among women revealed "how women are 
systematically deprived of a self and how that process of deprivation constitutes socialization to 
femininity"). 
96. Most radical theorists would probably concede that a class-based analysis would suggest that 
race and gender are not the only bases for oppression. For example, American society contains wealthy 
members of all minority groups as well as poor members of the majority white race. However, the 
relevance of class to radical multiculturalist analysis is a subject of some internal debate within radical 
scholarship, and is not very prominently featured in its arguments for justice. See, e.g., Donna R. Lee, 
Mail Fantasy: Global Sexual Exploitation in the Mail Order Bride Industry and Proposed Legal 
Solutions, 5 ASIAN L.J. 139, 165 (1998) (stating that in order to be a useful analytical framework for 
Asian Pacific women's issues, radical feminism's "focus on gender to the exclusion of ... class must 
be avoided"). I therefore pass over it here. 
97. See, e.g., Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist 
Feminism in the 1980s, in FEMINISM/POSfMODERNISM 190, 197 {Linda J. Nicholson ed. 1990) {stating 
that minority women have been defined as a group "by conscious appropriation of negation" and find 
themselves "at the bottom of a cascade of negative identities"). 
98. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of 
"Diversity," 1993 WIS. L. REV. 105, 154-61 (propounding the importance of drawing on a shared 
perspective grounded in oppression in a group's fight for equality). 
99. Seep. 73 ("[M]inority scholars (or at least some of them) are said to write in a unique 'voice 
of color' that makes their race part of their scholarship."). 
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feminist Catharine MacKinnon frequently speaks of "woman's point of 
view," a mindset that is not inherently or naturally female but is created 
and perpetuated by a society built upon the foundational principle of male 
supremacy. 100 
If radical multiculturalist theory is grounded in the three core truths 
listed above, then the paradox at its core becomes immediately apparent. 
It seems clear as an initial matter that radical multiculturalists must deal 
with the problem of determinism that appears inherent in their theories. 
For example, if one accepts the radical feminist view that women are 
socially constructed to be victims it becomes difficult to explain the 
feminist movement. If women lack authentic individual "selves" because 
they have been constructed to possess the psychology of subservience, how 
do they come to realize that this condition is unjust? How are they able to 
decide that sex inequality is wrong and to organize politically to end it?101 
The feminist movement arose from the conviction that women were treated 
uQjustly, and that they did not deserve inferior treatment but instead were 
entitled to equality. 102 Such beliefs must proceed at some level from 
women's strong sense of self and from their ability to act independently to 
100. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 51-52 (critiquing Carol Gilligan's thesis on the 
different moral reasoning of women and explaining that any such "different voice" is a product of male 
supremacy). 
The discussion thus far raises two important concerns in light of Farber and Sheny's analysis. 
First, is it fair to classify these principles as truths, and thus to imply that radical theorists are just as 
objectivist and as value-dependent as their liberal adversaries? Could radical scholars not argue that 
even these fundamental premises are merely strategic positions designed to further their own quest for 
societal power, or that the truths they suggest are matters of perspective that may be perceived only 
by certain persons or groups and not by others? I think both of these arguments implausible, the first 
because it implies bad faith on the part of radical theorists-that they are merely using the words 
"justice" and "equality" in order to further a quest for powe~ that is in fact motivated only by self-
interest-and the second because, to the extent that the truths about social domination and its effect on 
perspective are not perceivable by nongroup members, the efforts of radical scholars become 
inexplicable. Why waste time writing scholarship when the points you seek to make are already known 
by your own group as a result of its experience, and are simultaneously unknowable by other groups 
because they lack your experience? The most plausible conclusion is_that radical scholars believe what 
they are saying, and that their scholarship constitutes an effort to convince others that their views are 
true and right. 
101. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 115. MacKinnon recognizes this problematic 
quecy: 
/d. 
Feminism criticizes this male totality without an account of women's capacity to 
do so or to imagine or realize a more whole truth. Feminism affirms women's point· of 
view, in large part, by revealing, criticizing, and explaining its impossibility. . . . If 
women had consciousness or world, sex inequality would be hannless, or all women 
would be feminist. Yet women have something of both, or there would be no such thing 
as feminism. Why can women know that this-life as we have known it-is not all, not 
enough, not ours, not just? Now, why don't all women? 
102. See Anne Phillips, Introduction to FEMINISM AND EQUALITY 1, 6-7 (Anne Phillips ed. 1987) 
(explaining that the view of equality embodied in the traditions of liberalism and republicanism served 
as an early basis for western feminist thought). 
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fight for their rights-in other words, from women's agency. Radical 
feminism gives women no credit for their efforts to transcend gender 
discrimination and adverse socialization to achieve equality. 103 Similarly, 
scholars of race who theorize a shared psychology of victimization among 
disadvantaged minority groups lack an explanation of how such groups 
have managed to better their political and legal situation. 104 Progress, 
and the independent thought and action necessary to achieve it, become 
impossible to explain (except as a gift from the privileged) in a world 
comprised only of victims and oppressors. 105 
In radical circles, this problem has become known as the sin of 
"essentialism." In the jurisprudential context, essentialism is the idea that 
large groups of people-for example, women or African 
Americans-possess a single, monolithic experience and world view that 
can be categorized and analyzed independently of the individual differences 
among the members of such groups. 106 Postmodem legal theorists charge 
that essentialism is fatal to the legitimacy of a political theory because it 
artificially creates unity amidst irreducible difference. 107 There is no 
such thing, argue antiessentialists, as a unitary "voice of color" or 
"woman's point of view"; to argue otherwise is to deemphasize or erase 
the reality of nontranscendable difference. 108 In short, antiessentialists 
apply the metaphysical assumptions of radical multiculturalist theory to 
radical proposals for political and legal reform. They deny the existence 
of a universal human nature consisting of shared characteristics (such as the 
capacity for rational deliberation) around which a progressive society can 
103. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 304, 327-28 (1995) (suggesting that dominance theory tends to dismiss the possibility 
that women have the capacity to act outside the sphere of male domination). 
104. Seep. 56 (stating that "[a]ttributing differing success rates to discrimination or disadvantage 
••• ignores the rise of the black middle class"). 
105. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581, 612-13 (1990) (arguing that gender essentialism "has hindered the ability of women, and 
in particular black women, to leartt to construct themselves in a society that denied them full selves"). 
106. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN 
FEMINIST THOUGHT ix (1988) (criticizing the "tendency in dominant Western feminist thought to posit 
an essential 'womanness' that all women have and share despite the racial, class, religious, ethnic, and 
cultural differences among us"); Harris, supra note 105, at 585 (defining "gender essentialism" as "the 
notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of 
race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience"); id. at 588 (describing "'racial 
essentialism'-the belief that there is a monolithic 'Black Experience,' or 'Chicano Experience'"-as 
a "corollary to gender essentialism"). 
107. See Harris, supra note 105, at 615, 615-16 (deriding essentialist political theories as 
dangerous to the greater project of energizing legal theory because "hitheno silenced" voices will 
continue to be excluded under these theories). 
108. See id. at 594-95 (explaining that feminists often superimpose a theoretical framework onto 
women of color that privileges the experiences of gender over race, thus ignoring fundamental questions 
about racial experiences). 
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be organized; they also deny the existence of universally valid truths about 
the proper structure of law and politics. 109 Thus, political reform 
proposals that rely on articulating a single "voice of color" or "women's 
point of view" necessarily deface the truth that human differences will 
always disrupt the essentialist unities underlying such theories. 
At first glance, antiessentialism appears to open a space for the 
introduction of agency and autonomy under cond_itions of oppression. 
Without letting go of the postmodern premise that human beings are 
entirely socially constructed, antiessentialists point out that the experience 
of human beings is not as totalizing as essentialists would have it-that 
even those groups that have been most oppressed have often managed to 
develop a strong enough sense of self and justice to fight, successfully, 
against racial and gender inequality. 110 
But antiessentialism carries its own set of potential dangers and risks, 
which threaten to lead radical theory into a trap similar to the one set by 
essentialists. Antiessentialist theory introduces a mistrust of "group-think" 
in an effort to recognize fundamental difference. But if group desires may 
not be coherently articulated in group terms, then how are demands for 
political and legal reform to be articulated? The instant that radical 
feminists begin to speak about "women's point of view," anti essentialists 
destabilize the category "women" by pointing out that black women's 
experiences of oppression have been fundamentally different from those of 
white women, 111 and that lesbian women, married women, single women, 
rich women, and poor women all have experiences that call into question 
any claim to speak in a single "woman's" voice. The same destabilizing 
maneuver can of course be employed with respect to any other attempt at 
group categorization; a claim that racial minorities speak in a single "voice 
of color" is subject to the criticism that the Chicano experience has been 
fundamentally different from the black experience, that the experience of 
black women differs from that of black men, that black lesbian women 
have different things to say than have black straight women (or white 
straight women), and so on. 112 
109. See id. at 592 (criticizing dominance theory as seeking to convey a universal truth, which 
does not adequately encapsulate the experiences of black women). 
110. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 105, at 612-13 (noting that African American women have 
managed to reconstruct their identity in the face of oppression). 
111. See SPELMAN, supra note 106, at 125 ("Such an [additive analysis of sexism and racism] 
distorts Black women's experiences of oppression by failing to note important differences between the 
contexts in which Black women and white women experience sexism."); Harris, supra note 105, at 686 
(explaining that black women have been arguing that their experience calls into question the notion of 
a unitary "women's experience"). 
112. As professor Anne Dailey observes: 
Anti-essentialism ultimately challenges the anthority of all standpoint epistemologies by 
denying that any particular perspective has a special claim to truth. No matter how 
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Indeed, this fracturing of group-think into smaller and smaller 
subgroups does not even stop at the level of the physical individual. 113 
The antiessentialist Angela Harris has written that "we are not born with 
a 'self,' but rather are composed of a welter of partial, sometimes 
contradictory, or even antithetical 'selves.'" 114 The individual body is 
important simply because it is the site of experience, but experience does 
not create a unified individual "self." Instead, the human mind is a vessel 
containing partially assembled pieces from different jigsaw puzzles. 115 
Thus, antiessentialist theory reintroduces the problem of agency. 
While radical political theory made agency116 seem impossible under its 
totalizing assumption that disadvantaged groups are constructed to be 
victims, antiessentialist thought views human consciousness as a "brown 
bag of miscellany propped against a wall, " 117 treating any idea of an 
"essential" or "core" self as a dangerous myth that ignores the foundational 
reality of difference. 118 In this view, autonomous, willed action becomes 
happenstance. Rather than being a function of a shared human desire for 
justice or the product of a core ability for rational deliberation, agentic 
action represents the chance occurrence in some human bodies of exper-
ience that happens to produce a preference for social equality and a desire 
for justice. 
If difference is the most profound truth about human psychology, then 
the concepts of right and wrong and of justice and injustice cannot 
transcend individual consciousness and cannot, therefore, be used to craft 
laws generally applying to all without coercing some. Taken to its logical 
carefully we parse the dimensions of difference, further distinctions will present 
themselves. A politics based on the connections among black women can splinter along 
lines of class; a politics based on the connections among black middle-class women can 
splinter along lines of sexual preference; a politics based on the connections among black 
middle-class lesbian women can splinter along lines of religion, and so on. What we 
seem to be left with after the anti-essentialist critique has exhausted itself is a politics of 
the self. 
Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to liberalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1265, 1272 (1993) (book review). 
113. See infra text accompanying note 131. 
114. Harris, supra note 105, at 584; see also id. at 608-12. 
115. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 112, at 1272. Dailey gives the following explanation: 
And not even that. Anti-essentialism has led some feminists beyond women's difference 
from men or from each other to reach fundamental questions concerning the unified nature 
of human identity. For many •.• theorists .•. identity or selfhood cannot fairly be 
viewed as a fixed transcendent whole, but is instead a socially-constructed mix of contra-
dictorY impulses and fears. 
116. In the radical lexicon, "agentic action" denotes "resistant action" by an individual in the face 
of oppression, rather than nonagentic action or passivity. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 352 n.198, 
369. 
117. Harris, supra note 105, at613 (quoting ZORANEALE HURSTON, How It Feels to Be Colored 
Me, in I LOVE MYSELF WHEN I AM LAUGHING .•. AND THEN AGAIN WHEN I AM LOOKING MEAN 
AND IMPRESSIVE 152, 155 (Alice Walker ed., 1979)). 
118. See supra note 115. 
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conclusion, this line of thought, like that of the essentialists, weighs against 
the very possibility of a just politics and law. If individual persons consist 
merely of passive intersections between the various social constructs that 
have formed them as distinct psychological entities, on what basis can the 
law mediate between their different claims? On what basis can individuals 
come to a noncoerced agreement about the correct premises and proper 
ends of legal institutions? And supposing that such agreement could be 
reached within a particular society, what justifies that society in seeking to 
develop its own context-driven values-even basic values such as equality 
and respect for the dignity of all persons-in other cultures that reject those 
values? This is, of course, Farber and Sherry's central point; radical legal 
theory cannot justify progressive law or politics. 
C. The Structure and Contribution of Radical Theory 
Radical theorists want to talk about injustice and argue for an end to 
inequality in terms that are persuasive to everyone. Their search is for a 
political mode of discourse that grants maximum recognition to human 
difference while also offering the possibility of agreement on fundamental 
political values and legal institutions. 119 
The radicals' attempt to escape this paradox has led them into 
rethinking, and in some cases reconstructing, the values and assumptions 
of liberalism and of liberal individual rights. 120 In a jurisprudential field 
dominated by radical attacks on "liberal legalism" -particularly its purpor-
tedly atomistic conception of the individual, its suppression of radical 
difference among people, and its reliance on the universal applicability of 
abstract values-this statement may seem incoherent. But radical legal 
theory seems to be finding its way toward a reconstruction of 
Enlightenment values that ultimately celebrate both the importance of the 
individual and the necessity of designing the law around the protection of 
individual rights. 
Postmodern scholars assail liberal legal systems on three main 
grounds. They contend, first, that the conception of the reason-following 
"autonomous individual" that underlies some liberal visions of legal rights 
119. See, e.g., CAROL C. GOULD, MARx'S SOCIAL ONTOLOGY: INDIVIDUALITY AND COMMUNITY 
IN MARX'S THEORY OF SOCIAL REALITY 9 (1978) ("The whole or unity that is reconstituted in these 
internal relations among the individuals is thus mediated or differentilited by their individuality, hut 
unified by their communality."). 
120. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Autonomy and Agency, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming 
1999); Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, supra note 103; PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINISf 
THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLmCS OF EMPOWERMENT (1991); Harris, supra 
note 105; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 
90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991) (advocating a theory of separation assault as a way to rethink the problem 
of domestic violence that would emphasize the banerer's behavior, not the victim's). 
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and equality is a myth. There is no such thing as a shared human capacity 
for rational autonomy as liberals understand it. 121 Second, postmodern 
critics argue that liberalism suppresses fundamental "difference" among 
humans, masking such difference by assuming a universal human capacity 
for autonomy and designing the state and the law to honor that capacity by 
remaining neutral among individual visions of the good. 122 Critics of 
liberalism attack liberal neutrality as a myth that cloaks the continued social 
dominance of elites that have amassed power in the absence of state 
coercion. 123 The third postmodern claim is that the character and behav-
ior of human beings is a function of social constructs, especially those of 
gender, race, sexual orientation, and class. 124 Since the particular 
121. See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEW ENG. 
L. REv. 1173, 1184-85 (1992) ("Rather than think of the individual subject as a unitary and sovereign 
subject whose self-directed vocation is to bring the world to heel through the exacting discipline of 
rational inquiry, postmodernism interrogates the whole idea of autonomous subjectivity and abstract 
reason .... "); id. at 1192 ("[P]ostmodernists suggest that the traditional notion of authenticity-'to 
thine own self be true'-is an immediate patient for postmodern surgery."); Iris Marion Young, The 
Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISMIPOSfMODERNISM 300, 310 (Linda J. 
Nicholson ed. 1990) ("The idea of the self as a unified subject of desire and need and an origin of 
assertion and action has been powerfully called into question by contemporary philosophers."); id. at 
308-09 (criticizing the liberal conception of moral autonomy). 
122. See, e.g., Young, supra note 121, at 307 ("[L]iberal individualism denies difference by 
positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by or in need of anything or anyone other 
than itself."). 
123. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 94, at220 (arguing that the liberal conception of equality 
as employed in sex discrimination law conceals "the substantive way in which man has become the 
measure of all things"); id. at 224 ("Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely 
define insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies defmed workplace expectations and 
successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their 
experiences and obsessions define merit, their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines 
family, their inability to get along with each other-their wars and rulerships-defmes history, their 
image defines god, and their genitals define sex. These are the standards that are presented as gender 
neutral."); Derrick Bell, supra note 19, at 6-8 (discussing contradiction between America's ideal of 
equality and its reality of racism, and arguing that "[m]uch of what is called the law of civil rights •.• 
has a mythological or fairy-tale quality"); Angela P. Harris, Fonvard: Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 
82 CAL. L. REv. 741, 754 (1994) (critical race theory "puts law's supposed objectivity and neutrality 
on trial, arguing that what looks like race-neutrality on the surface has a deeper structure that reflects 
white privilege"); id. at 759 ("History has shown that racism can coexist happily with formal 
commitments to objectivity, neutrality, and colorblindness."); Young, supra note 121, at 168-69 
(arguing that the liberal ideal that "applies the same standards to all perpetuates disadvantage because 
real group differences remain that make it unfair to compare the unequals"); id. at 173 ("[P]olicies that 
are universally formulated and thus blind to differences of race, culture, gender, age, or disability often 
perpetuate rather than undermine oppression."). 
124. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 93, at 19-23 (discussing social construction of difference in 
the context of the "difference dilemmas" it produces); Foster, supra note 98, at 111 ("To be useful in 
achieving the goal of equality, a diversity rationale should recognize those differences that have been 
constructed into a basis for, and have resulted in, systemic exclusion and disadvantage for individuals 
possessing those differences."); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A 
Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 505 (1994) ("The postmodern 
critique of liberal explanations of the self posits that culture, not human nature, gives humans their 
sexual orientations."); Harris, supra note 123, at 762 (discussing the postmodern "problem of the 
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constellation of formative contexts125 faced by each individual will 
differ-with added force between cultures-postmodern critics advance the 
idea that it is necessarily an illegitimate assertion of power to design the 
law around a universal set of assumptions about human nature and 
values. 126 
These attacks contain important truths. First, they correctly expose 
as illegitimate the attempts of some liberal philosophers to insulate 
liberalism from value-laden political debate by positing the liberal state as 
neutral among visions of the good. 127 Such liberal neutrality is a myth. 
Liberal jurisprudence reflects a particular vision of human beings and of 
their proper relation to each other and to the state, a vision that is just as 
vulnerable to contention and debate as any other political and legal 
theory. 128 
Liberal theory has benefitted greatly from radical attacks on certain 
liberal attempts to separate individual rationality, agency, and autonomy 
from the social circumstances that undoubtedly influence the development 
and exertion of those qualities. 129 But the most important discovery that 
subject" and claiming that "[t]he language of race creates, maintains, and destroys subjects, both inside 
and outside the law"); id. at 784 ("[R]acial communities, like other human communities, are the 
products of invention, not discovery."); Hutchinson, supra note 121, at 1192 (arguing that identity "is 
a cultural creation, not a biological given"); Allan C. Hutchinson, Inessentially Speaking (Is There 
Politics After Postmodemism?), 89 MICH. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (1991) (book review) ("[T]he 
postmodem temper has no eternal truth to offer and no immutable knowledge to dispense; it accepts 
the historically situated and socially constructed character of truths and knowledges. "); id. at 1564 
("Differences are culturally imposed and socially policed."). 
125. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REv. 561, 583 (1983) ("Deviationist doctrine sees its opportunity in the dependence of a social world 
upon a legally defined formative context that is in tum hostage to a vision of right."). 
126. See MINOW, supra note 93, at 124 (noting that "liberal individualism" excludes "infants, 
married women, slaves, servants, apprentices, the very poor, and the mentally deficient" and asserting 
that the law "governing these people retained qualities of the status relationships that had been all but 
eliminated from others"); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 166·67 
(1990) (noting that "liberal humanism ... ignor[es] differences of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity," 
whereas "[t]he politics of difference insists on liberation of the whole group of Blacks, women, [and] 
American Indians"). 
127. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 55 (1980) 
(indicating that the liberal principle of neutrality "does not distinguish the merits of competing 
conceptions of the good"); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977) (observing 
that the liberal conception of equality mandates that government "must not constrain liberty on the 
ground that one citizen's conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to another's"). 
128. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 249 (asserting that liberal jurisprudence 
"rationalize[s] male power by presuming that it does not exist"). 
129. See, e.g., p. 8 ("Rich and interesting scholarship has come from the pens of radical feminists, 
critical legal scholars, gay legal scholars and critical race theorists. They have much to add to 
discussion of issues like affirmative action, where the conventional debate has become stale and our 
society desperately needs some fresh perspectives."); Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. 
L. REv. 479, 488 (1989) ("We can have only the thoughts, and ambitions, and convictions that are 
possible within the vocabulary that language and culture provide, so we are all, in a patent and deep 
way, the creatures of the community as a whole."); Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be 
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has resulted from such criticisms is that liberal legalism is not rendered 
irrelevant by the importation of social influences into its conception of the 
autonomous individual-that the possibilities of autonomy, reason, and 
agency have transcended this necessary change in liberal ideas and continue 
to form the proper basis of, and justification for, law. 130 This discovery 
has driven radical multiculturalists inexorably towards rethinking their own 
views about autonomy, reason, and agency-a response which renders 
much of Farber and Sherry's analysis moot. 
D. From Agency to Rights 
1. The Idea of Agency.-Radical feminists have taken the first step 
towards resurrecting the liberal belief in individual autonomy and indivi-
dual rights by introducing the concept of agency into the radical dialogue. 
For example, the recent work of Professor Kathryn Abrams traces the 
emergence within radical feminism of a concept she calls "partial agency," 
which she describes as an attribute that allows women, who are signifi-
cantly burdened by the socially constraining force of male domination, to 
nevertheless act against their oppression in ways that demonstrate a 
capacity for self-direction. 131 Although Abrams pays tribute to radical 
feminist dominance theory, she recognizes that its complete reduction of 
women to passive victims of gender hierarchy neither describes the real 
experience of women nor serves the feminist purpose of achieving gender 
equality. 132 Professor Abrams argues for a "respectful supplementation" 
a Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247,289 (1984) (admitting that "there is a core of truth in [the] radical 
critique of liberal theory"). 
130. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 1 {1986) {formulating a modem theory 
of liberalism that "may tum out to include elements borrowed from other political traditions"); id. at 
19 (noting that freedom as a value is "intimately intertwined with others, and cannot exist by itselF); 
Stephen F. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodem 
Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L. J. 2243, 
2278 (1993) (noting that "autonomy-as understood in postmodem terms-lies not in our 
disengagement from the constraints of community and tradition" but instead in "our conscious 
participation with others in tradition"); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote 
Moral Ideas After All, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1353 (1991) (asserting that liberals "can support the 
policy agendas of those critical movements that are inspired by and consistent with the goals of 
furthering and strengthening the substantive liberal values of freedom, equality, and human dignity"). 
131. Abrams, supra note 120; Abrams, supra note 103, at 304 (describing the emergence of a 
contemporary critique, whose focus has shifted from the possibilities of transgressive, self-directed 
female sexuality to the possibilities of women's agency and resistance). 
132. Abrams, supra note 103, at 354-55. Distinguishing between agency and dominance theories, 
Abrams explains: 
[The partial agency] critique takes issue with dominance theory for its often-strategic 
repression of the possibility of such resistance. This muting of the agency theme in 
dominance-based accounts of the female subject provides an incomplete picture of 
contemporary women's lives, and may cause its message to be manipulated by 
opportunistic critics, or misunderstood by potential allies, such as the courts. This version 
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of dominance theory to incorporate partial agency, and she makes a power-
ful case that her reconstructed vision of agency should become the basis for 
changes in the law. 133 
Another widely respected example is the work of critical race theorist 
Angela Harris. In her well-known critique of feminist essentialism, 
Professor Harris criticizes the feminist view134 that women share a collec-
tive identity or self, and that individual human beings are born with, or 
"naturally" develop, coherent, unified "selves." But Harris also argues 
that the idea of individual "will" can be rehabilitated and serve as the 
engine of human development and moral progress in a way that incorpo-
rates the mistrust of postmodem scholars for the rigid categorization and 
simplistic group-based politics that have categorized both our existing legal 
system and many proposals to reform it: 
It is a premise of this article that we are not born with a "self," but 
rather are composed of a welter of partial, sometimes contradictory, 
or even antithetical "selves." A unified identity, if such can ever 
exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny or natural 
birthright. Thus, consciousness is "never fixed, never attained once 
and for all"; it is not a final outcome or a biological given, but a 
process, a constant contradictory state of becoming, in which both 
social institutions and individual wills are deeply implicated. 135 
Harris, and other antiessentialist critics, rescue the postmodem critique 
of liberalism from normative oblivion by introducing, alongside the reality 
of social construction, the transcending qualities of will and 
imagination. 136 These theorists see the human capacity for creative action 
!d. 
of the agency critique seeks to highlight this repressed element through a respectful 
supplementation of dominance theory. . . • [T]he goal would be to depict women as 
possessing a constrained but nonetheless salient capacity for self-direction, while 
addressing the underlying conditions of women's oppression. 
133. See id. at 354-76. Abrams also discusses the writings of five other scholars in the feminist 
and critical race camps who are seeking ways to reintroduce a value for agency into radical legal 
theory. See id. at 335-346. 
134. Harris focuses specifically on "gender essentialism" in the work of Catharine MacKinnon and 
Robin West. See generally Harris, supra note 105. 
135. Harris, supra note 105, at 584; see also Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple 
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989) ("Holding on to a 
multiple consciousness will allow us to operate both within the abstractions of standard jurisprudential 
discourse, and within the details of our own special knowledge." (emphasis in original)); Dailey, supra 
note 112, at 1266-67 (asserting that the antiessentialist movement has "led feminism toward the 
articulation of a renewed liberalism .•• commit[ ted] to individual diversity within community"). 
136. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 142 (1990) ("My argument is that there need 
not be a 'doer behind the deed' but that the 'doer' is variably constructed in and through the deed."); 
Matsuda, supra note 135, at 9 ("(T]he best lawyers ... are able to detach Jaw and to see it ... from 
a particular viewpoint. Those lawyers can operate within that view, and then shift out of it .... [Such] 
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not only as a means of constructing personal identity from the fragments 
of experience but also as a way of building political unity while 
simultaneously recognizing the profundity of human difference. 137 
Neither Abrams nor Harris allies the rediscovery of agency to 
traditional liberal theory; indeed, they would undoubtedly protest such a 
connection. 138 Nevertheless, the reconstruction of agency within radical 
legal theory has potentially far-reaching consequences, for the quality of 
self-determination, will, or imagination that it celebrates contains the three 
elements essential to a redeemed concept of individual rights under law. 
First, it acknowledges that societal forces dramatically influence personal 
development; as I discussed above, this represents a much-needed improve-
ment over some liberal visions of the "autonomous individual." 139 
Second, it nevertheless treats the individual person as the basic unit of 
agency and responsibility. Angela Harris acknowledges that this recovery 
of individual responsibility can be realized only at some cost to certain 
schools of feminist thought, but she concludes by emphasizing its upside 
potential: 
This insistence on the importance of will and creativity seems to 
threaten feminism at one level, because it gives strength back to the 
concept of autonomy, making possible the recognition of the element 
of consent in relations of domination, and attributes to women the 
power that makes culpable the many ways in which white women 
multiple consciousness ... encompasses ... the search for the pathway to a just world."); JOAN 
SCOIT, GENDER AND THE POLmCS OF HISTORY 42 (1988). Scott writes: 
I d. 
I d. 
Within these processes and structures, there is room for a concept of human agency as the 
attempt (at least partially rational) to construct an identity, a life, a set of relationships, a society 
within certain limits and with language-conceptual language that at once sets boundaries and 
contains the possibility for negation, resistance, reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric invention 
and imagination. 
137. See Harris, supra note 105, at 615. Harris concludes: 
Finally, on a collective level this emphasis on will and creativity reminds us that bridges 
between women are built, not found. The discovery of shared suffering is a connection 
more illusory than real; what will truly bring and keep us together is the use of effon and 
imagination to root out and examine our differences, for only the recognition of women's 
differences can ultimately bring [the] feminist movement to strength. 
138. Abrams, in particular, argues that her concept of partial agency should be distinguished from 
traditional liberal accounts of individual autonomy. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 351 (" [L]aw tends 
most frequently to assume a simplified version of the liberal subject: a subject capable of uncompro-
mised agentic self-determination, to whom legal authorities ascribe full responsibility for actions taken, 
and on whose behalf they are generally reluctant to intervene."); id. at 376 ("[T]he simplified liberal 
premises that underlie legal subjectivity may need to be revisited in accordance with more sophisticated 
accounts of liberal subjectivity or post-structuralist accounts of a decentered subject, who 
unproblematically juxtaposes agency with constraint." (citations omitted)). 
139. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
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have actively used their race privilege against their sisters of color. 
. . . However, at another level, the recognition of the role of 
creativity and will in shaping our lives is liberating, for it allows us 
to acknowledge and celebrate the creativity and joy with which many 
women have survived and turned existing relations of domination to 
their own ends. Works of black literature like Beloved, The Color 
Purple, and Song of Solomon, among others, do not linger on black 
women's victimization and misery; though they recognize our pain, 
they ultimately celebrate our transcendence. 140 
Finally, this recaptured conception of individual will serves as the 
engine for moral and legal progress. As the power which can (at least 
partially) liberate us from our social determinants, individual agency 
becomes the shared human faculty that both unites our striving for the good 
and makes them possible. Rights offer the maximum room for the exercise 
of difference while grounding legal equality in the "sameness" of agentic 
capacity. It follows that, to the extent the law should be a force for justice 
and social progress, the law should protect the exercise of individual will, 
creativity, and imagination. Perhaps the law, according to this recon-
structed respect for liberalism and liberal values, should even go so far as 
to take as its core function the protection of individual rights. If so, radical 
theory has now come full circle, from treating "liberal legalism" as public 
enemy number one to endorsing a vision of the person and of agency that 
celebrates-even makes mandatory-the organization of the law around the 
dignity of the individual and the legal protection of her rights. 
2. Individual Rights as the Outgrowth of Agency.-Legal rights insti-
tutionalize respect for the individual, and this serves at least two important 
goals. First, rights give direct protection to individual choices deemed 
important. 141 Second, the construction of law around rights acts on 
society. Law is both a socially constructed and a socially constructing 
force-its form both reflects societal judgments and creates those 
judgments. 142 Thus, the choice of individual rights as the form of legal 
protection will inevitably reinforce the importance of individual agency in 
society. Indeed, this fact is the basis for many attacks on liberal legalism, 
especially from communitarians. 143 
140. Harris, supra note 105, at 613-15. 
141. See infra text accompanying note 147 for a discussion of what these choices ought to be. 
142. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Speaking of Rights, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 259,267 (1992) (book 
review) ("The discourse of law is more than just an instrumental tool, it is a 'species of social 
imagination' that is 'constructive of social realities rather than merely reflective of them.' Law, like 
other cultural systems of signification, both creates cultural meaning and mediates the way in which 
we ascribe meaning to our experiences." (citation omitted)). 
143. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POUTICAL 
DISCOURSE 14 (1991) ("In its relentless individualism, [rights talk in American society] fosters a 
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These effects of rights have not gone unnoticed by radical legal 
scholars, some of whom have argued for the retention of rights for both 
substantive and instrumental reasons. 144 A claim to a legal right in 
political discussion ensures some protection against the power of disagree-
ing majorities. A rights claim usually earns the claimant a respectful 
hearing in a society and legal system that is dominated by this form. 145 
But the appeal of rights for the disadvantaged is not purely 
instrumental. Indeed, Patricia Williams has written powerfully of the 
substantive importance of rights for African Americans, and of her fear 
that those on the left who reject rights do so from a racially privileged 
position: 
The white left is perhaps in the position of King Lear, when he 
discovered in himself a "poor, bare, forked animal" who needed 
no silks, furs, or retinue, only food, water, and straw to sleep 
on .... 
. . . Reduced to the basic provisions of food, water, and a 
straw pallet, kings may gain new insight into those needs they 
share with all humankind. For others, however-slaves, 
sharecroppers, prisoners, mental patients-the experience of 
poverty and need is fraught with the terrible realization that they 
are dependent "on the uncertain and fitful protection of a world 
conscience," which has forgotten them as individuals. For the 
historically disempowered, the conferring of rights is symbolic of 
all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect 
that places one in the referential range of self and others, that 
elevates one's status from human body to social being. For 
blacks, then, the attainment of rights signifies the respectful 
climate that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvantages caretakers and 
dependents, young and old."). 
144. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 164 (recognizing a need for rights both to raise a 
person to the position of a "social being" and to gain power in relation to others). 
145. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 93, at 297 (remarking that rights claims demand "an equality 
of attention" and "makeO those in power at least listen" (emphasis in original)); id. at 307 ("There is 
something too valuable in the aspiration of rights, and something too neglectful of the power embedded 
in assertions of another's need, to abandon the rhetoric of rights."); Ainsworth, supra note 142, at 266. 
Professor Ainsworth avers that 
an appeal to rights-based claims in the judiciary has been instrumentally effective, 
particularly for racial minorities and women. Rights are recognized as "shields" against 
the exercise of legal power by all actors in the legal system, thus serving to temper state 
power in ways that would not occur absent the invocation of rights. True, such rights-
based appeals are not invariably successful; but given the disproportionate lack of access 
to the material wealth needed to compete in the electoral political arena, subordinate 
groups should be loath to give up a strategy that has provided some measure of legal 
protection to them. • • . [F]or groups with neither voter strength nor financial resources 
••• rights discourse may be the only plausible way to protect their interests. 
Jd. (foomotes omitted). 
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behavior, the collective responsibility, properly owed by a society 
to one of its own. 146 
Rights convey equality and respect for all persons-the foundational 
goals of all movements on behalf of disadvantaged groups. 
If we accept the foregoing argument that legal rights are the proper 
focus of efforts to further social justice, a more difficult question yet 
remains: Which rights would best achieve this goal? Which rights would 
be best designed to protect and develop individual agentic capacity? 
For the purposes of argument, start from the idea developed above147 
that all humans share agentic capacity and that protecting and developing 
this capacity ought to be a central project of a legal structure that is 
concerned about achieving social justice. The autonomy reconstructionists 
have crafted the concept of agency or imagination or will by adding to the 
liberal conception of autonomy the corrective idea that human beings are 
not completely independent and free-acting but are instead powerfully 
influenced by the social forces and relationships that envelop their 
formation as persons. 148 Accepting this model of the person, the question 
becomes what specific rights the law, acting as one such social force that 
protects agency, should confer on persons in the interest of achieving 
justice for disadvantaged groups? 
At the very least, the traditional liberal "personhood" rights are 
obvious candidates for legal protection. Such rights offer all citizens the 
chance to express and develop directly their agentic capacity. Examples 
of such rights include the right to openly dissent from the majority view on 
controversial issues, the right to vote, the right to own (at least certain 
kinds of) property, 149 and the right to privacy, understood as the right to 
bar others from accessing personal information about oneself without good 
reason. 
However, the reconstructed vision of autonomy suggests that such 
rights cannot be viewed as the sum total of the state's responsibility to 
further agency. These traditional liberal rights are aspirational insofar as 
underlying societal conditions prevent members of some groups from bene-
fiting from them. As feminists have pointed out, the equal right to dissent 
under the First Amendment may be at least partially vitiated by socially 
146. W!LUAMS, supra note 19, at 152-53 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
W!LUAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act 3, sc. 4, 11. 106.()8, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE, supra 
note 43; MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 53 (1984)). 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 93-118. 
148. See Abrams, supra note 103, at 346 (discussing the idea of "panial agency" as one "that 
foregrounds questions of agency, more concretely juxtaposing women's capacity for self-{!irection and 
resistance, on the one hand, with often-internalized patriarchal constraint, on the other."). 
149. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Propeny and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957-
1014 (1982) (distinguishing between forms of property that have meaning to persons and forms that 
are essentially fungible, market goods). 
1999] Defending Truth 533 
enforced silence. lso The equal right to vote can be destroyed by physical 
intimidation. The equal right to own property can be corrupted by econo-
mic conditions that are rife with bigotry and hierarchy. lSI Because 
societal forces can so powerfully influence the development and exercise 
of individual agency, the law should intervene to create rights that will 
adjust those forces when necessary, so that they become agency friendly, 
particularly with respect to historically disadvantaged groups. 
Such a second tier of rights might include, for example, the right to 
be protected against physical and emotional abuse and even the "right" to 
the punishment of an abuser. Although the work of Angela Harris, 152 
Martha Mahoney, 1s3 Elizabeth Schneider, 154 and others demonstrates 
that individual agency can and does survive despite abuse, surely a legal 
structure that celebrated agency would attempt to destroy, or at least 
punish, forces of abuse that limit that capacity. Thus, the protection of 
agency implies protecting all individuals against the horrors of rape and 
domestic violence. 
Individual rights, on this view, also ought to include the right to act, 
with the backing of the state, against group-based bigotries such as sexism 
and racism. Such bigotry fails to appreciate individual agentic capacity, 
instead assuming certain truths about an individual based on his or her 
group membership, whether that membership be based on race, gender, 
ethnicity, choice of sexuality, or any other characteristic. Iss Such 
assumptions flatly contradict the premise, fundamental here, that persons 
are to be treated with respect as individuals on the basis of their capacity 
for agency. 
3. The Chimera of Group Rights. -A remaining question raised by the 
idea of partial agency is what it implies regarding theories of "group 
rights" such as those proposed by Will Kymlicka, who argues that liberal 
societies have over-focused on individual rights and have ignored the 
potential of group rights: 
150. See MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 195-214 (discussing the damaging effect on women of 
protecting pornography under the First Amendment). 
151. See Radin, supra note 149, at 961-62 (contending that objective criteria in labeling something 
personhood property is needed, otherwise there is a risk of "ethical subjectivism" in determining 
whether the property is legally recognized). 
152. See supra note 105. 
153. See supra note 120. 
154. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the 
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 220-21 (arguing that agency 
must be examined in trials i\tvolving battered woman syndrome in order to explain how or why the 
woman could overcome her victimization and take action). 
155. See MINOW, supra note 93, at 235 (asserting that "[w]hen some people assign others to a 
group, such as a racial minority, this assignment may trigger in the observers mental associations with 
other [negative] traits" (footnote omitted)). 
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In particular, [liberals] reject the claim that group-specific rights are 
needed to accommodate enduring cultural differences rather than 
remedy historical discrimination. . . . 
However, it has become increasingly clear that minority rights 
cannot be subsumed under the category of human rights. . . . 
. . . The right to free speech does not tell us what an appropriate 
language policy is; the right to vote does not tell us how political 
boundaries should be drawn, or how powers should be distributed between 
levels of government; the right to mobility does not tell us what an 
appropriate immigration and naturalization policy is. These questions 
have been left [by liberal theories] to the usual process of majoritarian 
decision-making within each state. The result [is] ... to render cultural 
minorities vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, 
and to exacerbate ethnocultural conflict. 156 
Radical scholars of race and feminism have also argued that individual 
rights perpetuate race- and gender-hierarchy and are thus the antithesis of 
justice. 157 These scholars have proposed that the law respond to group-
based bigotry by building group rights into our economic and political 
institutions. In the context of law school admissions, for example, Richard 
Delgado argues that current affirmative action policies should be 
"overhaul[ed]" in favor of a system under which "a proportionate number 
of minorities, whites, and women [gain] admission. " 158 Other scholars 
of race echo this call for proportional representation in various contexts, 
ranging from election to political bodies to allocation of jobs in both the 
private and public sectors. 159 Additionally, legal and political theorists 
have recently argued in favor of a variety of specific group rights, 
including the right to speak a particular language, 160 the right to group-
156. WILL KYMUCKA, MULTICULTURAL CmZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
4-5 (1995). 
157. See, e.g., DELGADO, supra note 4, at 157-163 (warning of the dangers to disadvantaged 
minorities ofEnlightment liberalism); MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 157-70 (describing perpetuation 
of women's oppression in the liberal state); MINOW, supra note 93, at 147 (averring that individual 
rights theories result in the exclusion of some groups from societal power); id. ("Rights analysis offers 
release from hierarchy and subordination to those who can match the picture of the abstract, 
autonomous individual presupposed by the theocy of rights. For those wbo do not match that picture, 
application of rights analysis can be not only unresponsive but also punitive."); id. at 377 ("Rights 
analysis ..• fails to supply a basis for remaking ..• institutions to accommodate difference."); id. at 
382-83 (defining the idea of "rights in relationship"); Young, supra note 121, at 300 ("Liberal 
individualism denies difference by positing the self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by or 
in need of anything or anyone other than itself."). 
158. P. 47 (quoting Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil 
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 572 (1984)). 
159. See, e.g., infra note 161. 
160. See, e.g., Anthony Housefather, Where Are the Bilingual Signs in Montreal's Stores?, GLOBE 
& MAIL, Aug. 5, 1996, at A13 (recognizing that the Supreme Coun of Canada agreed with all lower 
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based representation in elected legal bodies, 161 and the right to the 
protection of property that a particular group's culture holds to be 
sacred. 162 Other societies have responded to injustkes by directly 
recognizing group interests: 
[T]here [is] an alternative legal and constitutional language [to that 
of individual rights] to protect individuals who are penalized because 
of a group affiliation ... [, it is the] specific[] guarantees [of] the 
rights of groups, by name, ... [which] specifically reserve for 
groups a certain proportion of posts in government, in the civil 
services, in the universities, in business. This kind of approach to 
group rights is clearly just as compatible with a regime committed to 
human rights as the approach that focuses only on the individual. In 
one measure or another, we see this kind of approach in Canada, 
Belgium, Indian [sic], [and] Malaysia. 163 
Most of these policies to promote group rights either ignore or deni-
grate the value of individual agency which is defended here. The group-
rights advocates treat individualism as their mortal enemy and justify group 
rights on some other basis, such as the achievement of racial or gender 
diversity or the preservation of a particular culture. 164 
In the view of some radical scholars, such as Kymlicka, group rights 
can protect agentic capacity itself, as well as group well-being, more 
effectively than individual rights: 
[L]iberals should recognize the importance of people's membership 
in their own societal culture, because of the role it plays in enabling 
courts and the United Nations in striking down a law that prohibited public signs from being in any 
language other than French). 
161. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 156, at 34-48 (arguing for a group right to proportional 
representation); Derrick Bell et a!., Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of liberation, 31 
UCLA L. REv. 1037, 1090-91 (1990) ("The solution must come from proportional representation, not 
the remedies of the Voting Rights Act."); Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique 
of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 265 (1989) ("Until and unless group oppression 
or disadvantages are eliminated, political publics, including democratized workplaces and government 
decision-making bodies, should include the specific representation of those oppressed groups, through 
which those groups express their specific understanding of the issues before the public and register a 
group-based vote."). 
162. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Propeny: The Protection of Cultural 
Propeny in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REv. 559, 641-70 (1995); see also Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994) (granting ownership rights of Native 
American cultural items excavated on federal or tribal lands to the lineal descendants of the Native 
Americans or the applicableNativeAmericangoverniug authority); 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (1994)(imposing 
fines for the unauthorized sale, purehase, or trafficking of Native American human remains). 
163. Nathan Glazer, Individual Rights Against Group Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY 
CULTURES 123, 126 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). 
164. See, e.g., Young, supra note 121, at 305-07 (noting that contemporary critics ofliberalism 
proffer community as the preferred polar opposite); see also supra note 157. 
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meaningful choice and in supporting self-identity. While the 
members of a (liberalized) nation no longer share moral values or 
traditional ways of lire, they still have a deep attachment to their own 
language and culture. . . . group-differentiated rights that protect 
minority cultures can be seen, not only as consistent with liberal 
values, but as actually promoting them. . . . certain group-
differentiated rights are required by the principles of liberal 
justice. 165 
4. The Agentic Subordination of Group Rights to Individual Rights.-
To the extent that achieving group goals maximizes individual choice and 
helps develop agency, group rights are defensible under the partial-agency 
theory outlined here. But to the extent that the good of the group is 
depicted independently of, or is inconsistent with, the agency of individual 
members, group rights must be rejected. Thus, the reconstructed agency 
approach to rights changes the entire focus of the debate over social justice. 
Justice for groups becomes a value that is purely derivative of, and depen-
dent on, justice for its individual members. 166 For example, to the extent 
that "diversity" is put forth as a justification for group rights that is 
inconsistent with the goal of promoting individual agency, the goal of 
achieving "diversity" becomes illegitimate. 167 Likewise, organic visions 
of community, under which the good of the group is depicted as greater 
than the sum of the good to its individual members, become incoherent 
under this vision. As Kymlicka has admitted, "In some cases, measures 
to protect cultural membership may be unnecessary, or come at too high 
a price in terms of other liberal goals. " 168 
Indeed, the community is properly seen as the enemy in many cases, 
the enforcer of discrimination, bigotry, and the domination of women. 
This is because, in deciding the agentic potential of group rights, one has 
to keep in mind the powerful impact of the law as a socially constructing 
force. 169 This suggests that the structure of rights will have an impact on 
the structure of personalities because human psychology and behavior will 
be affected by how we construct the law. Indeed, this fact has long been 
165. KYMUCKA, supra note 156, at 105-06. 
166. The philosopher Michael Hartney suggests that group rights can only be justified in terms of 
the interests of the individual members of the affected group(s). See Michael Hartney, Some 
Confusions Concerning Collective Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 163, 
at 210-13. 
167. Acceptance of this proposition would have a dramatic impact on the debate over group rights, 
which is largely, although not exclusively, premised on the rejection ofliberal individualism and liberal 
respect for individual autonomy. See supra note 157. 
168. KYMLICKA, supra note 156, at 105-06. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 141-45 (arguing that law helps form societal judgments). 
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a primary ground on which communitarians criticize liberal rights. On 
their view, a system of legal justice built upon individual rights produces 
a society in which persons possess a grossly exaggerated sense of 
entitlement, an impoverished feeling of obligation toward others, and an 
attenuated capacity to empathically engage human difference. 170 
Communitarians argue that liberal rights create a citizenry consisting of 
mutually alienated individuals who tend to view others as potential threats 
to their freedom rather than as vital participants in society. 171 
Even if the communitarians were correct with respect to the majority, 
surely there can not be too much agency for members of disadvantaged 
groups, who may only recently have been able to assert their rights as 
persons. 172 If this is correct, then for disadvantaged groups the attrac-
tions of individual agency and the related appeal of rights will be especially 
strong. 
More importantly, group rights come with their own set of 
pathologies-pathologies that directly threaten the goal of protecting and 
developing individual agentic capacity. As Nathan Glazer explains: 
If we choose the group-rights approach we say that the differences 
between some groups are so great that they cannot achieve 
satisfaction on the basis of individual rights. We say, too, that-
whether we want to or not-we will permanently section the society 
into ethnic groups by law .... [Despite the] claim [that] this is a 
temporary solution to problems of inequality . . . it is inconceivable 
. . . that benefits given in law on the basis of group membership will 
not strengthen groups, will not make necessary the policing of their 
boundaries, and will not become permanent in a democratic society, 
where benefits once given cannot be withdrawn. In effect, American 
society, which was moving toward an emphasis on individual rights 
in which group affiliation and difference were to become a matter of 
indifference to the state, in which the state was to be concerned only 
that such affiliation did not affect the fate of individuals, will become 
something very different if it continues to move along the path of 
group rights. More groups will join [those] already selected as 
special beneficiaries. And with every movement in the direction of 
170. See generally Glendon, supra note 143. 
171. See generally Suzanna Sheny, Civic Vinue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544-48 (1986) (asserting that the underlying theme of individualism 
is autonomy and separation); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988) 
("Every other discrete, separate individual-because he is the 'other' -is a source of danger to me and 
a threat to my autonomy. I have reason to fear you solely by virtue of the fact that I am me and you 
are you. • . • [B]y definition my ends are not your ends."). 
172. See WtLUAMS, supra note 19 (arguing that society should grant blacks certain affirmative 
individual rights and that a formalized equal opportunity policy is empty and aesthetic after years of 
second class citizenship). 
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group rights, the individual's claim to be considered only as an 
individual, regardless of race, color or national origin, will be 
reduced, as more and more places are reserved to be filled on the 
basis of group affiliation. 173 
From the agentic perspective these consequences would be obviously, and 
perhaps fatally, destructive, flowing from the profound tension between the 
individual and group when it comes to structuring legal rights. To the 
extent, in short, that a concern to protect individual agency does not result 
in individual rights, the goal of protecting and developing agency through 
law would certainly be harmed, and could be nullified by any expansion in 
group rights. 
And to the extent that group rights necessarily strengthen group 
affiliations and weaken respect for the individual agency of group 
members, they violate the agentic approach to social justice. So, under an 
agency-based analysis, the benefits of proportional representation must first 
be great enough to outweigh the pathologies of group rights and still 
advance individual agency more than the individual-rights approach to 
affirmative action. At the very least, this would be a heavy burden for 
group rights to bear, and probably establishes at least a presumption in 
favor of rejecting proposals for proportional representation and adopting 
instead an individual-rights approach to racial justice. 
In any case, such a policy debate would be new and refreshing. Shed 
of all talk of "groupness," community, or diversity except as derivative 
values, it would refocus the issue of social justice where it belongs: on 
individual rights, and more specifically, individual opportunities to exercise 
autonomous capacity. 
5. Conclusion: Rights and Justice.-lf the argument here is correct, 
then rights grounded in individual agency are not the enemies of disadvan-
taged groups, as many radical scholars have claimed, but instead bear a 
crucial, and positive, relationship to the attainment of social justice. This 
agency-based perspective also allows us to realize that, contrary to the 
claims of communitarians, there may be a fundamental tension between the 
good of community and justice for its disadvantaged groups. The 
community, after all, is the source not only of the good in a culture but 
173. Glazer, supra note 163, at 137. A large body of political science literature makes this point. 
See, e.g., ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 47 (1982) ("[B]y reinforcing civic 
orientations that encourage group egoism, foster distrust of other groups, and weaken perceptions of 
a general interest more important than the specific concerns of each organized group, organizations 
encourage more serious consideration of alternatives that promise visible short-rnn benefits to a 
relatively small number of organized citizens than alternatives that promise substantial long-run benefits 
to a larger number of unorganized citizens."). See generally 11IEODORE J. LOWI, 11IE END OF 
LIBERALISM: 11IE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979). 
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also of the corrupt and evil. Communities preserve as "culture" the 
prejudices, the bigotries, the injustice, and the historically sanctioned 
hierarchies that block the way toward social justice. And even the culture 
of disadvantaged groups, which can be a source of strength and cohesion 
within the group, also absorbs, contains, and enforces externally imposed 
bigotries that may continue to oppress group members once the external 
forces of oppression have weakened or disappeared. This is the message 
of Catharine MacKinnon's critique of relational feminism and of anti essen-
tialist concern about the power of fixe~ social categories. It is community 
feeling and standards that are often the enemy of social justice. Changing 
those standards may well require a renewed allegiance to rights that protect 
the development of will, imagination, and agency of individuals willing to 
defy their communities on behalf of social justice, either for themselves or 
for others. Not only can agency-based rights advance the cause of justice 
for women and minorities; such rights are the best, and perhaps the only, 
way of doing so. 
Farber and Sherry are correct that the philosophical premises of 
nonagentic radical multiculturalism will not generate a political theory that 
takes a firm stand against injustice. To the extent that radical theorists 
want to argue for an end to racism and sexism, they must accept the possi-
bility of authentic human agency and of developing shared values across 
difference. Radical theory has itself moved to acknowledge these facts, 
and in the process it has found itself allied to a reconstructed version of 
liberalism that has adapted to the best of radical critique while simultane-
ously insisting on the value of human agency, the primacy of individual 
dignity, and the necessity of crafting shared values in a legal context that 
respects difference by protecting individual rights. 
